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RICHARD STITH

New Constitutional and Penal Theory in Sp,a nish
Abortion Law
The abortion debate in the United States is a clash of individualisms: the proponents of individual rights for putative unborn persons array themselves against the advocates of individual rights for
women. Although the Left sides almost exclusively with the latter, 1
it is hard to discern anything more than a tactical nexus of abortionrelated issues with the socialist goal of community-based
decisionmaking. 2
Not so in European law. The important 1975 West German decision mandated, laws against abortion from a dramatically communitarian perspective,3 as has been so ably pointed out by Donald
Kommers. 4 The Spanish Constitutional Court decision of 11 April
RICHARD STITH is Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. The author is indebted

for assistance to Professors Antonio Carlos Pereira, Antonio Garcia Cuadrado, Cole
Durham, Mary Ann Glendon, John GorbyJ Donald Kommers and John Potts, as well
as to Paige Cunningham.
1. Mark Tushnet, a former coordinator and still a frequent speaker for the
Critical Legal Studies movement, has called the right to reproductive choice "a leftish sort of right which, it is said, leftists must recognize as not relative lest they lose
their political credentials." Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights," 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363,
1365 (1984). Note, however, that Tushnet goes on to argue such a right would no
longer make sense even to leftists in a society slightly different from our own. See
also infra n. 21.
2. Quintana Ripolles,. in his historical analysis of abortion legislation, is puzzled
by the fact that at the political level European socialists have long tended to favor
more elective abortion, despite the ..individualism" he sees represented by such a position. He theorizes that past explicit use of anti-abortion laws to increase the armies and labor forces of capitalist nations may have caused socialists to oppose such
laws. I would add that Left commitments to sexual equality could also point in this
direction. But neither demographic decline nor women's equality seems necessarily
to further the development of socialism. 1 Tratado de Derecho Penal, Parte Especial,
504-05 (1962).

3. Decision of 25 February 1975, [1975] :39 BVerfGE 1. Translated into English
by Jonas & Gorby, "West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v~ Wadewith Commentaries," 9 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 551 (1976).
4. Kommers, ''Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Germany,''
25 Am. J. Comp. L. 255, 280-284 (1977) and "Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Constitutional Perspective,'' 1985 Brigham
Young U. L. Rev. 371, 391-399. For a quite useful critique from an individualist perspective,-see Gerstein & Lowry, "Abortion; Abstract Norms, and Social Control: The
Decision of the West German 'F ederal Constitutional Court,,. 25 Emory L.J. 849
(1976).
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1985,5 which was strongly influenced by the German one,6 is in
many (but not all) ways even more communitarian than that prior
opinion. Indeed, it may not be too much to say that social constitutional jurisprudence in the West may well find a landmark in this
Spanish case. Socialism is relevant to abortion after all, but in a way
quite different from that which might superficially have been
expected.
The key point, to be developed below, is that the Spanish court
considers the fetus neither a person possessing rights, as U.S. prolife people argue, nor subject to a person possessing rights, as prochoicers argue. Instead, unborn life is treated as a distinct constitutionally protected legal good. The nature of this Spanish status of
the fetus as a public value will be elucidated in this commentary,
and its status will be compared with that of unborn life according to
the highest tribunals of Germany and the United States.
It will further be seen that the use of this value to require the
prohibition of elective abortion is intimately linked in Spain, more
explicitly than in Germany, with the communitarian ideal of the
"Social State". U.S. constitutional doctrine, being much more individualist, might well not have required such a result even if the fetus had been recognized by our Supreme Court to have a very high
public value.
Yet the Spanish and German decisions contain a surprise: At
the same time that they base the protection of fetal life on the importance of public values, they withdraw that protection when continuation of a pregnancy is "too mu<:h to demand" or
"nondemandable" ("inexigible" and "unzumutbar", in the words of
the Spanish and German courts respectively) of the individual pregnant woman. I will point out that abortion in such hardship cases
may come under a paradoxical category of penal theory in which individuals are legally justified (not merely eJ(CUsed) in doing that
which from the standpoint of public legal values remains unjustified.
5. Decision of 11 April1985, STC 53/1985 (Pleno). The official version was first
published in 119 Boletin Oficial del Estado [hereinafter BOE] 10 (suplemento, 18
mayo 1985), but I have hereinafter cited the clearer and perhaps more accessible
1985-49 Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional [hereinafter BJC] 515.
6. I do not believe this assertion to be controversial. The Spanish decision refers repeatedly to the German one in summarizing arguntents of counsel. ld. at 521,
523, 526, 527. In the Comision de Justic1.a e Interior debates on 25 February 1983,
opposition leader Ruiz Gallard6n referrea to the government's repeated statements
that German law had been an inspiration for the present abortion depenalization
proposal. The responding Justice Minister, Ledesma Bartret, did not dispute this assertion. Cortes Generales, Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, II Legislatura,
Num. 18, 1983 at 6 ff. According to Ernst Benda, former President of the Constitutional Court of West Germany, the Spanish Court itself has been modeled on the
German one. See "Constitutional Jurisdiction in West Germany," 19 Colum. J.
Transnat'l. L. 1 (1981).
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This individualist doctrinal counterthrust may be just as important
as the communitarian expansion occurring in the same Spanish
abortion case. References to Germany and to the U.S. will again
make this clear.
Before turning to case analysis, however, it would be well to define with greater precision the basic categories I have been and will
be using: To the degree to which a "community" (or "socialism")
exists, shared public values are effectively pursued by all. As long
as those values inhere in states of being rather than in conduct considered right in itself, rules are unimportant. For example, if neighbors were to gather to build a common barn, it would be silly to set
down rules granting individual claim rights to hammers. There
would no doubt be temporary rule-like guidelines provided, in order
to aid coordination, but the common goal would be to use hammers
wherever they are most needed. No individual would insist on getting his or her prescribed turn with a hammer, if a neighbor could
use it better for their shared purpose.
By contrast, to the degree to which a society is 'individualist',
there are no public values. All goals are personal and private, and
human beings interact only insofar as necessary in order for each to
achieve his or her private values. Consequently, rules are very important. For example, if a number of individuals are constructing
their own separate barns, and there is a scarcity of tools, they will
surely set down a set of rules for sharing hammers. These rules will
differ from the temporary guidelines used by the neighbors above
not only in their substance but also in their lack of flexibility. Pri·
vate planning requires certainty about rules, requires rights. This is
particularly so if the others involved are competitors or even enemies, so that one is disinclined to relinquish a turn at the hammer
even if one happens to have run out of nails.
At a constitutional level, a court might impose one or the other
of these models. It might insist that the State require all to work
together for a common goal (e.g., life), or it might insist that the
State refrain from coordinating common pursuits in order to further
the private values of individuals. Or, of course, it might do neither
and let the whole matter remain in the hands of legislatures .
\

•

CHRONOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF THE DECISION

Prior to the bill here at issue, the Spanish Penal Code did not
explicitly exempt any abortions from punishment.7 However, the
general defense of necessity includes an exemption for acts done to
.

.

7. Codigo Penal arts. 411--417. Published as Codigo Penal y legislacion complementaria (1984).
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avoid harm equal to or greater than the harm caused,8 which would
make non-punishable at least those abortions necessary to preserve
maternal life.9
Soon after the sweeping Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol
(PSOE) electoral victory of 1982, which gave the party an absolute
majority in the Spanish legislature, the new government propoSe'd
an addendum to prior abortion law, 10 declaring abortion unpunishable in certain circumstances. As approved by the Congress of Deputies on 6 October 1983, and by the Senate on 30 November 1983, the
bill read:
Abortion will not be punishable if performed by a physician, with the consent of the woman, when any one of the
following circumstances is present:
1. That it is necessary in order to avoid a serious danger to the life or health of the pregnant wo:man.
2. That the pregnancy is the consequence of an act
constituting the crime of rape under art. 429, provided that
the abortion is performed within the first twelve weeks of
gestation and that the aforementioned act has been
reported~

3. That it is probable that the fetus will be born with
serious physical or mental defects, provided that the abortion is performed within the first twenty-two weeks of gestation and that the unfavorable prognosis is registered in an
opinion issued by two medical specialists other than the one
operating on the pregnant woman.11
The post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978 established for
the first time a Constitutional Court with the }lower of judicial review of statutes.12 Consistent with the Kelsenian European tradition, a petition alleging, unconstitutionality may be interposed by
8. Codigo Penal art. 8(7).
9. The supplemental brief of the anti-abortion petitioners (dated 3 January
1983[sic]) further states that in practice abortion was never punished when done for
any of the reasons listed in the government's abortion depenalization bill, found infra note 11 and accompanying text. Therefore, the brief argues, statutory reform
serves no purpose except to prepare the way for fully elective abortion.
10. The addendum was to be inserted at the end of the existing sections on abortion and numbered "417 bis."
11. This is a translation of the bill as it appears in the Constitutonal Court's
opinion STC 53/1985, of 11 April, as published in the BJC, supra n. 5 at 531, which is
slightly modified in capitalization and punctuation from the version earlier printed_
in the BOE, supra n. 5.
12. The Court is made up of twelve members (four chosen by three..fifths of the
Congress, four by three-fifths of the Senate, two by the current government, and two
by the General Council of the Judicial Power), as authorized by art. 159(1) of the
Constitution of 1978 [as found in Leyes politicas del Estado (1984)]. Members are
elected for nine-year terms, which are staggered over three-year cycles. Art. 159(3).
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certain authorized persons, without the need to await a concrete injury.13 A 1979 sub-constitutional law, repealed in 1985, further established the right of these same persons to insist that the Court
hear such a petition before certain allegedly unconstitutional bills
could enter into effect.14
On 2 December 1983, the latter sort of petition was filed in the
name of fifty-four Deputies led by the conservative Alianza Popular
party~ After receiving a series of supplements and responses during
the first half of 1984, the Constitutional Court finally announced its
decision on 11 April 1985. The abortion reform bill was declared in
certain details to be an unconstitutional violation of article 15 of the
Constitution, which reads "All have the right to life and to physical
and moral integrity...." ("todos tienen derecho ala vida y ala integridad fisica y moral" ..."). Although the twelve members of the
Court were evenly divided for and against this declaration, Spanish
practice in effect permitted a second and tie-breaking vote to be cast
by the President of the Court, Dr. Manuel Garcia Pelayo y Alonso,
an ex-soldier for the Spanish Republic who became an internationally-known scholar during his years outside of Spain.15
After a lengthy development of the arguments presented by the
petitioners and by the governmental respondent, the Court built its
position on twelve ''Legal Foundations'' (Fu-n damentos Juridicos),
concluding with the holding of unconstitutionality. Five dissenting
opinions, one of which is co-authored, follow.
The Court's argument in brief paraphrase is this: Human life is
a superior constitutional value (Legal Foundation, hereinafter L.F.,
_3) and a Social State such as Spain has an affirmative duty to secure
it by law (L.F. 4). :T his life is a reality distinct from the mother
from the beginning of gestation and, therefore, the "one to be born"
(nasciturus) 16 must be considered a "legal good" (bien juridico) ac13. Art. 162(1)(a} of the Constitution of 1978.
14. Organic Law of the Constitutional Court (Ley Organica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional) art. 79(2). Repealed by Ley Organica 4/1985, de 7
de junio (BOE num. 137, de 8 de junio).·
15. The vote was not exactly along socialist vs., conservative lines. Of the six
members of the "majority", two were those nominated by the General Council of the
Judicial Power. The Court's p~esident had been approved by the PSOE. The remaining three were originally proposed by the old centrist party, the UCD, which
virtually disappeared in the 1982 elections. The only woman on the court co-authored the resulting Court opinion. "El tribunal de los 12," El Pats, 12 April1985, p.
13. Additional chronological and biographical details may be found on the same
page. See also "Asi votaron los doce magistrados," Ya, 12 April 1985, p. 5, and Diario
16, 12 April1985, pp. 6-7.
16. The Latin word "nasciturus" is here translated literally into English. despite
the resultant oddity of speaking of the "one to be born, perhaps being aborted. "Fe...
tus" would not be an acceptable alternative because the Spanish court had available,
and elsewhere used, the equivalent '1eto". Simply leav.ing the term untranslated
would also not be appropriate; for the Latin word would not have the same feel in
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corded protection by the Constitution. Legislative history indicates
that the framers of the Constitution intended this result (L.F. 5),
even though neither Spanish nor international law requires the conclusion that the one to be born possesses a personal subjective right
to this protection (LL.FF. 5, 6, and 7). Such protection must be effective and, if necessary, include penal sanctions, although it need
not be absolute (L.F. 7).
The Constitution also guarantees personal dignity, which includes rights such as free development of one's personality, physical
and moral integrity, and personal and family intimacy (L.F. 8).
When constitutional values collide, the legislator must weigh them
and try to harmonize them or, if necessary, to specify the conditions
under which one may prevail. He must also not forget the limits to
what is reasonably demandable by the penal law. In carrying out his
judgments, he need not turn only to the generalized exemptions
from punishment found in article 8 of the Penal Code, but may use a
different technique for certain crimes such as abortion (L.F. 9).
After disposing of statutory vagueness problems by indicating,
for example, that a "serious danger" is one which involves an important and permanent diminution of physical or mental health (L.F.
10) the Court applies the foregoing principles to the bill in question. There is nothing unconstitutional in permitting the destruction
of unborn life where the mother's life is at stake. Given a "serious
danger" to her health, the mother's own right to life and to physical
integrity is affected; not to punish abortion here :is constitutional, especially in light of what is demandable by penal law. Rape violates
personal dignity in the highest degree, and the law clearly cannot
demand that the victim bear its consequences. As for the case of serious physical or mental fetal defects, recourse to penal sanctions
against abortion would impose conduct beyond that which is normally demandable of a mother (L.F. 11).
The constitutionality of the non-punishment of abortion in such
circumstances has thus been established, according to the Court.
However, the State continues to have an obligation effectively to
guarantee the life and health both of the woman and of the one to
be born. It must, therefore, make sure that neither the former nor
the latter is disprotected any more. than may be required by those
circumstances. For the protection of the woman, the State should
provide that the abortion take place in public or private health centers authorized for this purpose. For the protection of the one to be
English as it would in Spanish. "Nasciturus" would connote a birth-related being to
the educated Spanish reader, both because of its clear link to the Spanish nacer (to
be born) and because of its most frequent use in civil law contexts where, in fact, the
expectation of birth is uppermost in mind.
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born, in order to be certain that the first type of circumstance (serious maternal life or health danger) exists, the Constitution demands
that the opinion of a medical specialist be obtained prior to the abortion. Similarly, the opinions of the two specialists regarding any fetal disabilities must be_obtained in advance of any abortion. Such
changes, without excluding other possible ones, would permit the
bill finally to be enacted into law (L.F. 12).17
In the last two sections of its opinion, the Court declines to require paternal participation in the abortion decision (L.F. 13), or to
enter into subsidiary civil law issues such as the_relation of non-punishable abortion to social insurance. It does point out, though, that
conscientious objection to abortion is protected by the Constitution
(L.F. 14).
PRENATAL LIFE AS A LEGAL VALUE FOR THE COMMUNITY

The Constitutional Court of Spain finds that the one to be born
has not been shown to possess any constitutional rights. At the
same time, the fetus is protected by the Constitution, and indeed is
protected by the sentence "All have the right to life. . . ." Let us
look more closely at the reasoning and results of these apparently
contradictory findings by the Court.
The idea that our objective legal duties necessarily correspond
to others' subjective rights is not universal;18 being in the form we
know it a development of late scholastic- nominalism19 and Enlight17. The government did not delay in complying with the Court's demands. On
12 July 1985, a new enactment was published in BOE, supra n. 5 no. 166. (Ley Or..
ganica 9/1985, de 5 de julio, de reforma del articulo 417 bis del Codigo Penal.) The
significant changes are as follows: The new law contains a preliminary paragraph
requiring abortions to be_done in an accredited health center, and requires a prior
second medical opinion confirming that an abortion is necessary to avoid a serious
danger to the life or health (which now explicitly includes mental health) of the
pregnant woman. The law, however, does not require the second opinion {nor the
woman's express consent) in an emergency. A new section indicates, in accordance
with a remark of the Court, that the pregnant woman will not be punished even
when an (otherwise non-punishable) abortion occurs in violation of the requirements
of a health center or of confirming medical opinions.
Regulations setting accreditation standards have become a focus of controversy
under the new law.
18. See e.g., Lacruz Berdejo, "El Derechjo Subjetivo,." -3 Elementos de Derecho
Civil, Parte General, 77...87 (1984). See also _B enn, "Rights," in 7 Encycl. Phil. 195
(1967), Benditt, Rights 3-8 (1982) and Hart, "Bentham on Legal Rights," in Simpson
(ejd.), Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence (second series) 171...202 (1973). The best short
histories in English of the idea of a right may be Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights 205~210 (1980) and Golding, "The Concept of Rights: A Historical Sketch/' in
Bandman & Bandman (eds.), Bioethics and Human Rights, (1978).
See also Gold.
ing's more refined "Justice and Rights: A Study in Relationship;; Shelp (ed.), Justice and Health Care 23•35 (1981).
19. Prof. Michel Villey has defended the thesis that William of Ockham was
among the first fully to conceptualize subjective rights over property. Ockham did
so, according to Villey, in order to permit the Franciscans more easily to renounce
.
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enment individualism. Some cultures apparently have no need to
reify the benefits 'o f the legal order and ascribe the ownership of
these abstract benefits (primarily, the power to choose to make
claims) to individual actors or subjects (whence "subjective,). Even
today, we ordinarily think of the criminal law as a set of duties
which do not respond to individual claims. l certainly have a duty
not to steal from my neighbor, but only the State, not my neighbor,
has the right to insist that I not do so under pain of criminal sanction. Analytically, the idea that duties need not .e ntail rights is defended by a number of philosophers today.2 o The rise of socializing
legal theory has also put pressure on the idea of individual claim
rights. as a foundation of the legal order.21
The received European legal protections accorded to the fetus
cannot easily be squeezed into this modern subjective rights ideology.22 Of the many nations following Continental traditions, apparently only Argentina has. seen fit to acknowledge civil personality
23
from the moment of conception. The image of the person as a bargainer and a litigator indeed does not seem applicable to unborn life.
Of course, children after birth likeWise possess these traits of legal
personality only in potentia; yet they are accorded. personhood
such rights and thus to fulfill their radical vows of poverty. At the same time as
they renounced civil claims to property, they could continue to administer and to
use it in a physical sense. See Villey~ ~'Droit subjectif:' Seize essais de philosophie du
droit 140 (1969).
20.. See, e.g., the fine arguments .a nd citations in Weiss, "The Perils of Personhood," 89 Ethics 66 (October 1978), and in Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy
174 ff. and notes (1977). See also Feinberg. Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty
135~39, 144 (1980). The inverse proposition, that the absence of rights need not entail
the absence of duties has been well and relevantly put in Montague, "Two Concepts
of Rights," 9 Phil. and Pub. .A/f. 372, 384 (1980):
I suppose there is a sense in which I would deny that those incapable of
acting intentionally have rights, but I do not see that doing so has any morally objectionable consequences. It isn't as if, for example, that by denying
that infants have a right to self-defense I am sanctioning infanticide; what I
have said here implies only that the immorality of infanticide cannot be
grounded on the rights of infants. Infanticide as well as such things as
cruelty to animals and non-therapeutic experimentation -o n the severely retarded is immoral even if infants, animals, and the severely retarded have
no (exercisable) rights.
21. Lacruz Berdejo, supra n. 18 at 85. See, e.g., Marx, ••on the Jewish Question,"
Early Writings 211, esp. 230-231 (1975) and Sandel; Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice (1982)~ The socialist Mark Tushnet (supra n. 1) and Louis M. Seidman have
explicitly argued for the permissibility of fetal protection on a non-rights basis in "A
Comment on Tooley•s 'Abortion and Infanticide','' 96 Ethics 350 (January 1986).
Mirjan Damaska•s comprehensive new treatise contrasting the reactive and the
activist state is a particularly rich theoretical context within which to understand
the relative absence of rights in socialist law. See The Faces of Justice and State Authority 83 (1986).
22. Lacruz Berdejo, id. at 93·94.
23. Quintana Ripolles, supra n. 2 at 477. But cf. Jimenez de Asua, arguing that
the fetus still does not count as a "visible person" under Argentine law. 6 Tratado
de derecho penal988 n. 36 (2nd ed., 1962).
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(though the exercise thereof is necessarily by a representative),- so
that the exclusion of fetuses remains problematic.24 In any event,
prior to 1985 many or most Spanish legal theorists granted the fetus
a status lower than that of a person, perhaps even lower than that
recognized in France or Italy.25
Anti-abortion strategy during the constitutional debates if anything reenforced the non-personhood of the fetus. Fearful that the
sentence "All persons have the right to life..."could be read to protect only those who under the Civil Code had personality,-i.e., those
who had been born and were able to survive twenty-four hours,26
opponents of abortion substituted the sentence "All have the right
to life...", for the explicit purpose of protecting the unborn from
27
abortion. It became difficult for a court to say that a fetus is a constitutional person when the word ''person, had been struck from the
Constitution in order to ensure the inclusio.n of fetuses.
The Constitutional Court in fact does not argue the issue of
legal personality as_such. Instead, it considers the closely relate_d (if
not ultimately identical in modern law) issue of whether fetuses are
titulares, i.e., bearers or- possessors, ·o f a subjective constitutional
right to life. It finds that they are not, a conclusion in accordance
with the mainstream of Spanish legal tradition.
The Court nevertheless was faced with the apparently unanimous opinion of Spanish medical associations that the unborn child
is a living human being.28 From the materials available, the govern.

.

24. The existence of infant persons can support the assertion that potentiality is
sufficient for personhood and therefore that the unborn are likewise persons. See
Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola 709. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice 509 (1971),
maintaining that potential rationality must be the basis f.or a non-arbitrary recognition of rights. See also infra n. 43 and accompanying text for the German high
court's argument. Contrary resolutions are possible. It is common today for abortion-related philosophizing to end in approval of infanticide. See, e.g., the authors
Tooley and Warren cited by Weiss, supra n. 20.
25. Quintana Ripolles, supra n. 2 at 471 ff. See also Rodriguez Devesa, Derecho
penal espanol, Parte ·E special,- 100 n .. 42 (7th ed., 1979), arguing that feticide has
never been considered homicide. See generally Cuello Cal6n, 2(2) Derecho Penal 522
(13th ed., 19.72). Not all the juristic data are clear. For example, for civil purposes
the prenatal child is conditionally considered born and the possessor of rights,· provided that it eventually emerges viable from the womb. Codigo Civil art. 29. Published as Codigo Civil (8th ed., 1984). In criminal law, the Penal Code prohibits
consensual abortion under the title "Crimes against Persons" ("Delitos contra las
personas"), Codigo Penal, Titulo VIII.
26. Codigo Civil, arts. 29-30.
27. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, Num. 105, 6 July 1978, at 3952 ff. See also
the summary of these debates at L.F. 5 of the decision presently being considered.
28. The petitioners submitted statements from various medical associations to
this effect, and the government submitted none to the contrary, or at least none the
Court thought worth mentioning. See BJC,_supra n. 5 at 525. See also The Human
Life Bill S. 158, Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 97th Congress (1981), arguing that there is a
scientifie consensus concerning the fact that life begins at conception but not con-
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ment does not appear to have disputed the physical fact of human
life prior to birth. Instead, it approached the issue wholly formalistically, arguing that legal norms are independent of non-legal facts ·a
hard position to take when it comes to documents like constitutions
which are meant to limit the legal order for the sake of a socially
preferred physical reality. Moreover, the Court conceded that the
substitution of "all" for "all persons" had been intended to protect
nascent life. How could the Court conceptualize the legal status of
living but unborn human beings?
Traditional Spanish legal doctrine may have provided some
help, Not all legal goods in Spanish law have to pertain to individuals, or even to the State, in the manner of property ownership.
Goods in the public domain and communal goods have long been
recognized.29 It_has been argued that society, rather than the fetus
or the mother, is the titular of the protection accorded to the unborn child. 30 Anti-abortion spokespersons had argued that even
without a subjective right, the fetus may be protectable by an objec-..
tive norm, as a "-social good". 31 The Spanish Supreme Court (which
does not have the power of judicial review nor of authoritative constitutional interpretation given to the Constitutional Court) indeed
asserted in its decision of 11 January 1984 that
Human life in formation is a good that constitutionally
merits protection, is a constitutional legal good, a legal good
of the community and not an individual legal good....32
Even spokespersons for the right to abortion were willing to
concede that the unborn are a legal good of the community.33 Some
interpreted such a concession to mean, however, that what the community possessed it could dispose of by its representatives in the legislature, and thus that the legislative depenalization of abortion was
constitutionally permissible.34 Perhaps for this reason, the anti.

'

cerning the value to be accorded to that life. The U.S. report was cited by the Spanish petitioners in their brief of amplification, dated 3 January 1983 [sic], at 7.
29. Lacruz Berdejo, supra n. 18 at 42 ff., especially 51·55.
30. Quintana Ripolles. supra n. 2 at 477, reports some support for all three
possibilities.
31. Diaz Fuentes calls the fetus a "social good.,, in Diario de Sesiones del Congreso, No., 105, 5 October 1983; at 2943. Oscar Alzaga is cited by Cerezo Mir, in n .. 46
of his essay "La regulacion del aborto en el proyecto de nuevo Codigo Penal Espanol/' in La reforma penal (1982) to the -e ffect that the fetus is protected by an objective norm even without a subjective right.
32. TS 2a Sala 15 octubre 1983, reported in La Ley 11 enero 1984 at 1. Reversed
(in effect) on other grounds by the Constitutional Court. TC 2a Sala 75/1984. 27 de
junio, reported in La Ley, 24 octubre 1984 _a t 1. .
33. Sotillo Marti stated his agreement with the German high court that life in
the womb is a legal good protected by the Constitution. D'iario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Sesiones informativas de Comisiones, No. 61, 7 septiembre
1983, at 2139.
34. The article by Luis Arroyo Zapatero discussed below at n. 69 develops the
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abortion briefs in this case resist the idea that the one to be born is
only a legal good rather than a possessor of the right to life.35
Like the Spanish Supreme Court in the quotation above, the
Constitutional Court in effect takes the traditional concept of the
unborn as a protected legal good and inserts it into the constitutional "system of values." (LL.FF. 3, 4, 9). Since the Constitution
emanates from the community, it would seem (though the Constitutional Court does not use these precise words) that the unborn are a
legal good or value "of the community". But because of the superiority of the Constitution to ordinary legislation, the community has
in effect made a commitment to the value of unborn life such that it
no longer retains a right freely to dispose of that life by legislation.
The community could also be seen to be simply acknowledging a
preexisting and binding inherent value in such life. In either case,
one might say that the one to be born has become not so much a
good "of" the community, in a proprietary sense, but a good "for"
the community, a good at whose furtherance the community is
•
•
mm1ng.
It is worth pointing out that the very idea that there exists an
objective order of values in a constitution is communitarian rather
than individualist, because it makes the good, at least in part, public
rather than private. Such an order (i.e., not only a list but also a hierarchy) of explicit and implicit values mandates not only a minimum set of formal rules which government and citizens must
observe, but a set of goals they must aim at particularly when combined with the idea of the Social State discussed later in this
commentary.
Within this value order, life is not just any value, according to
the Spanish Court, but is a "superior value" (L.F. 3), a "fundamental
value" (L.F. 5), and a "central value" (L.F. 9). The Court reaches
this conclusion by noting that life is a presupposition for all other
rights, and by reflecting upon the placement of the right to life at
the head of the list of constitutional protections (L.F. 3). The unidea that what the community gives, the community can take away. Arroyo Zapatero, "Prohibicion del aborto y Constitucion," Rev. Facultad de Derecho de la
Universidad Complutense, no. 3, 195 (1980). The Constitutional Court's summary of
the government arguments indicates that the latter admitted the existence of unborn life as a legal good, but claimed that the legislature had discretion over its protection. BJC, supra n. 5 at 526-28. Four of the dissenters to the final decision
conceded that preborn life is or has some kind of legal value.
35. See e.g., the Court's summary, BJC, id. at 523, of petitioners' argument that
life is a fundamental right or an absolute value rather than merely a legal good.
Published anti-abortionist opinion had already rejected arguments like those of Arroyo Zapatero. See Federico Trillo-Figueroa ("La legalizacion del aborto en el derecho comparado:' at 113) and Fernando Diez Moreno ("El proyecto de Ley del
Aborto desde la perspectiva constitucional," at 181-89) in En defensa de la vida
(1983).
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born are taken to ''embody" (L.F. 5) this value, both because the
framers of the Constitution apparently intended the unborn to be
protected by the right to life clause of that document, and because of
the fact, noted by the Court, that human life is a Hreality from the
beginning of gestation'' (L.F. 5).
At the same time that the Court grants the fetus a high status
as a "constitutionally protected legal good" (L.F. 7), it balances its
conclusion by refusing to consider the unborn to "possess" the right
to life, as discussed above, and by the curious and unexplained remark that at birth, not before or after, the fetus acquires "full
human individuality'' (L.F. 5). Moreover, a careful reading of the
opinion will show that the Court never explicitly acknowledges that
the fetus is among the ·Hall'' referred to in the protective phrase "All
have the right to life....''
Let us try to understand this argument by means of an irreverent and slightly analogous hypothetical. Suppose the U.S. Constitution contained the following language: "'All bald eagles, as the
sacred symbol of the nation, have the right to life." Suppose further
that the framers of this clause had inserted the word "all" for the
precise_purpose of protecting embryonic eagles__as well as hatched
eagles. Would we have to conclude that inside an egg is an eagle, or
that a bird embryo has its own constitutional rights, in order to consider eagle eggs constitutionally protected? I think not. Such protection could be founded simply on our sense that an important
meaning and purpose of the Constitution would 'be thwarte·d if eagle
omelettes came into vogue.
The precise effort of the Court's elevation of fetal value is this:
The Court affirms the superiority, or even the equality, of the
mother's rights over the legal value of the fetus at most only in
those situations covered in the first statutory depenalization, i.e.,
where the mother's life or health is seriously endangered, both of
which values are found in the same Constitutional article held to
protect the unborn (L.F. 12). In order to uphold the other two
depenalizations, the Court turns instead to the doctrine of non-demandability discussed at the end of this article.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Court implicitly holds that
elective abortion is unconstitutional. It does so by indicating that
the obligation to protect the fetus requires the State to make sure
beforehand (by means of a second medical opinion) that no abortions are done except where the mother is truly threatened. The exact content of the Court requirement is unimportant here. The
point is this: If elective abortion were permissible, there would be
no constitutional life-related value infringed upon even where an
abortion were done outside the statutory provisions. By insisting
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that these provisions be strictly enforced in order to protect the unborn, the Court has clearly held the complete depenalization of
abortion to be unconstitutional.36 As a fundamental public value, developing human life cannot be- converted into purely private
property.
Not only did the Court manage to make this declaration in :a
case where elective abortion was n,o t even an issue, but it did so in a
manner highly likely to be acquiesced in by the government promoters_of abortion depenalization. It asked only for tiny, technical ad(litions to the bill~ which were soon forthcoming. Had it done more,
had it declared a broader right to life, the government might well
have refused to go along, provoking a constitutional crisis.37
One essential element in the Court's argument above has not
yet been fully explored the idea that in a Social State constitutional values form not only negative limits to governmental action
but also mold the required affirmative content of that action. This
element has been postponed in order to develop more clearly the
idea that the fetus has constitutional value in the first place, that the
Spanish Constitution contains common public values (here unborn
life) rather than only the rights of individuals. Mter a much briefer
look at how Germany and the U.S. conceive the fetus, and some critical remarks of my own, we shall return to this postponed discussion
of the interaction of fetal value and the Social State.
The 1975 West German Constitutional Court decision on abortion bears a striking resemblance to the 1985 Spanish ruling not
surprisingly since, as mentioned previously, the former served in
many ways as a model for the latter.
Focusing upon the constitutional language "Everyone has the
.

.

36. The Spanish court may to a degree have been inspired by similar languag~ in
the 1975 Italian constitutional abortion decision, though the earlier phraseology
would seem to appear in a procedural posture making it merely dictum: "[It] is the
legislator's obligation ... to forbid the procuring of an abortion without careful as..
certainment of the reality and gravity of injury or danger which might happen to the
mother as a result of the continuation of pregnancy: · Therefore the lawfulness of
abortion must be anchored to a preceding evaluation of the existence of the conditions which justify it." Carmosina et al., Corte Costituzionale. Decision of 18 February 1975, No. 27 [1975] 20 giur. Canst. 117. as translated in Cappelletti & Cohen,
Comparative Constitutional Law 612~14 (1979)~
37. Alfonso Guerra, vice-president of the PSOE government, on 26 March 1985
(sixteen days before the Court announced its decision) declared that if its law were
ruled invalid. the government would be forced to set up a "machinery for pardons"
for those obtaining abortions. The Court itself, he said, would be placed in "a socially difficult situation", and he expressed regret that twelve non...elected persons
should impede_the will of 350 ele.c ted ones. He went on to oppose the separation of
powers, calling it a relic of the epoch of Montesquieu, and promised to reform the
norms governing the Court. These statements placed the justices under ''intolerable
pressure" according to the opposition parties. ABC 12 abril 1985 at 5.3. The ·Court~s
elegant self-defense reminds one of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
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right to life... ," (Jeder hat das -R echt aW Leben . .. )38 the German
Court finds it unnecessary to hold the unborn child to be a person,
or a ''bearer" of a subjective right,39 in order to include it within the
protection of the Basic Law. Note, however, that the Court does not
shy away from referring to the unborn's "right to life". It avoids
only the question of whether the child is the ''bearer'' (or "possessor") of this right. Perhaps the Court is thinking of analogous positive constitutional welfare "rights" for adults which need not
necessarily give rise to individual claims presentable in a court. To
return to our hypothetical, a similar analysis would find that bald
eagles need not have civil law personality with access to courts in order to receive constitutional protection. Both this right-to-life guarantee and the explicit constitutional value of ''human dignity''40
leads the Court to rule that all human life, including prenatal life, is
part of the "objective ordering of values" of the Basic Law. 41 Even
the dissent agrees that the State has a constitutional duty to protect
unborn life, and indeed states that the existence of this duty is "uncontested" (unbestritten) 42 arguing further, however, that the duty
need not be implemented by criminal sanctions.
The German decision is somewhat more "pro-life" in its reasoning than the Spanish. Like the Spanish, it notes that human life_is a
continuum, but unlike the Spanish it does not see "full human individuality" occurring at birth. It states
The process of development . . . is a continuing process
which exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a
precise division of the various steps of development of the
human life. The process does not end even with birth; the
phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the
human personality, for example, appear for the first time a
rather long time afte.r birth. Therefore, the protection . _. .
of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the ucompleted" human being after birth or to the child about to be
born which is independently capable of living. 43
.

.

38. Basic Law (Grundge$etz) Art. 2, Sec. 2, Sentence 1.
39. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41. See the full translation of the German decision by
Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 641-42.
40. Basic Law, Art. 1t Sec. 1, Sentence 1. .Note that the Spanish constitutional
equivalent here (Art. 10, Sec. 1, Sentence 1) refers to "the dignity of the person,.
rather than to uhuman dignity" and played only a minor role in the Madrid decision.
41. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 41; Jonas & Gorby translation, supra n. 3 at 642.- For
discussion, see Gerstein & Lowry, supra n. 4 at 862, 867 and materials there cited.
42. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 68 (abweichende Meinung); Jonas & Gorbyt id. at 663
(dissent).
43. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 37; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 638. The Court appears to reason that as long as we protect newborn infants, whose human development is signifi..
cantly incomplete, consistency requires protection prior to birth. Indeedt consistency
requires a theory of' protection which either values organic human life itself or else
•
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Moreover, it specifically holds that the constitutional word "everyone" includes "everyone living"44 and that no distinction can be
made, with regard to the right to life, between unborn and born
life. 45 Thus it could be argued that in Germany the fetus is in all
but name constitutionally a person with rights, and so is closer than
in Spain to being a full legal bearer of subjective rights. Or, put another way, Germany is more individualist and Spain more communitarian in their respective rationales for deference to unborn life.
Another way to understand the two decisions, however, would
be to note that both call the one to be born a "legal value" or a
''legal good'' (Rechtsgut, bien juridico) rather than an individual possessing rights, although the German language is stronger concerning
the high rank of that objective legal value. In both nations, unborn
human life is an object more than a subject of constitutional protection, is a public value of the community rather than a private claim
46 The German Court's further conof the fetus or of
the
mother.
.
cern with government teaching and counseling in support of prenatal life also has a strongly communitarian ethos behind it. 47 The
Court clearly hopes to build a common value commitment rather
than only a balance of individual interests.
The explicit result of such fetal value recognition in Germany,
like that implicit in Spain, is a holding that elective abortion is unconstitutional, even in the first three months of gestation. 48 New
life, the next generation unborn, is the concern in some sense of the
values the developing potentiality for higher "phenomena specific to the human personality" for these are the only sources of inherent value which the infant possesses at birth. In other words, the Court argues that if we think newborns
inherently worthy of protection, our normative theories require us also to protect
life even in the early weeks of pregnancy. See further discussion infra, text accompanying n. 63-72.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. But note that the German court, despite its use of value terminology, insists
that such value cannot be aggregated, that each particular life must be protectedeven if the sacrifice of some could lead to the preservation of a greater number.
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 58-59; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 655-56. The refusal to aggregate is
a departure from ordinary valuing and is more at home in discourse informed by
rights.
Are there ways to avoid the ruthlessness of valuing, its common callousness toward particulars, without appealing to the selfishness of rights? I believe there are,
in the ideas of respect or reverence (which perhaps may be the deep grounds of the
German decision). See my critique of valuing, "Toward Freedom from Value;' 38
The Jurist 48 (1978), and my brief critique of rights in "Thinking about Ecology,"
XLV(1) The Cresset 7 (1981).
47. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 50, 57-58, 61-64; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 649, 651-55, 657-60.
For an excellent introduction to the German constitutional jurisprudence of values,
see Benda, "New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany," 11 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 1, 6-9 (1977). Dr.
Benda at that time was president of the Constitutional Court.
48. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 68; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 662..63.
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whole community, not only of individual pregnant women. Nevertheless, as in Madrid, the Court in Karlsruhe moderates the force of
this conclusion by holding that there are limits to what the community can ask individuals to contribute to this common value, and that
as a result laws may permit abortion in various situations of relative
hardship. 49 This individualist counterthrust will be examined further below.
The 1973 U.S. Supreme Court abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, is
in surprisingly many ways similar to the Spanish and German decisions. Like them, although much more strongly, it refuses to acknowledge constitutional personhood or rights possessed by the
unborn. 50 And just after its finding of non-personhood, in a largely
unnoticed portion of its decision, our Court creates a legal category
very similar to that into which the fetus is placed in those European
opinions: non-personal human life. That is, the U.S. court indicates
that its conclusion of non-personhood does not yet dispose of the
contention that there is a compelling state interest in protecting life
from the moment of conception. It does not respond to this contention by arguing that there would be no decisive state interest in protecting such non-personal life, should it exist, but rather by
indicating the Court's doubts as to whether the fetus is actually
1
human and alive in an extra-constitutional sense. 5 Presumably, had
the Court been sure of the existence of a living human fetus, it
would have found a strong public concern for fetal protection, similar to that found by the Spanish and German courts. In other words,
the U.S. court creates the same category (non-personal life imbued
with a high public value) brought forth by those other tribunals, but
then fails to fill it.
It may well be this single difference, not a difference of constitutional categories but a disagreement about the fact of actual
human life, accounts for the tremendously disparate conclusions on
abortion on the two sides of the Atlantic. For it is not only Spain
and Germany which agree that human life exists prior to birth. The
other four European constitutional courts which have considered the
matter appear to have reached this same conclusion,52 and none has
49. Very roughly speaking, the Court indicates that abortion need not be punished where the mother's life or health is at stake, or she has been raped, or the
child will suffer from a serious health impairment, or she labors under some
equivalent social hardship-inasmuch as each of these situations may make a continuation of pregnancy not demandable by means of the penal law. [1975] 39 BVerfGE
1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 647-49.
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973).
51. Id. at 159-62. See also infra n. 53.
52. The cryptic French opinion (permitting the legislature to leave most early
abortions unpunished) contains the phrase "Considering that the law [permitting
abortion] referred to this Conseil Constitutionnel does not authorize any violation of
the principle of respect for every human being from the very commencement of life

1987]

STITH: SPANISH ABORTION LAW

529

subsequently seen fit to recognize a constitutional right to abortion
in any way as sweeping as that of Roe v. Wade. By and large, abortion has been left by them in the legislative domain.
Yet although the Roe majority does not consider the unborn
child to be human and alive, it holds that the fetus does have some
public value, not as life but as "potentiallife".53 One might say that
Europe considers the unborn child to be a living human being, albeit only a potential legal person, while the United States treats it as
only a potential life. Nevertheless, there is some functional similarity to these two concepts, in that both recognize the fetus to be a
value worthy of public concern, as a "legal good" and as a "state interest" respectively.
But let us not forget that the Spanish and German decisions did
not rest with the affirmation that the fetus is a "legal good". Those
... except in case of necessity...." Decision of 15 January 1975, [1975] A.J.D.A. 134,
as translated in Cappelletti & Cohen, supra n. 36, at 577-78. For a different interpretation of the French decision, see Glenn, "The Constitutional Validity of Abortion
Legislation: A Comparative Note," 21 McGill L. J. 673, 677 and accompanying notes
(1975). The Italian decision referred to in n. 36 supra observes that Art. 2 of the
Constitution guarantees the inviolable rights of man, "among which must be placed,
although with the particular characteristics unique to it, the legal situation of the
foetus ['concepito')," at 613 of the translation, and later emphasizes obligatory protection for "the life of the foetus [:feto']," at 614, even while declaring that an embryo is
not yet a person, at 613, and that abortions for serious maternal health reasons must
be permitted. Corte Costituzionale, Decision of 18 February 1978, n. 27 [1975] 98
Foro It. I (Giurisprudencia Costituzionale e Civile) 515, 516. Even the Austrian decision, which alone holds that fully elective abortion in the first three months of pregnancy is constitutional, seems to concede "that throughout the whole duration of the
pregnancy both the mother's life and the nascent human life constitute constant
life", stating that the legislature is constitutionally free to protect the fetus by making abortion punishable, and is required to do so after viability if post-natal infanticide is punishable. Decision of 11 October 1974, Constitutional Court, [1974]
Erkliirungen des Verfassungsgerichtshofs 221, 234-35 G 8/74, as translated by Cappel·
letti & Cohen, supra n. 36 at 615, 620-21. The Portuguese decision of 19 March 1984
unanimously holds that the constitutional principle of the inviolability of human life
embraces ..intrauterine human life", even though it goes on to declare a limited disprotection of that life to be constitutional. 344 Boletim do Ministerio da Justir;a 197,
216, 230 (March 1985). Thus all four other European national decisions appear to
recognize actual rather than only potential human life in the unborn and to permit
and even to require some measure of constitutional protection for that life, with the
precise degree of protection left largely up to the legislature. See generally, Reis,
Das Lebensrecht des Ungeborenen Kindes als Verfassungsproblem (1984).
Mary Ann Glendon's forthcoming work, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
(1987), surveys the abortion laws of twenty Western nations and finds them all to be
more sympathetic than Roe to fetal life.
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 calls the fetus, e.g., "potential life" (at 150, 154),
"prenatal life" (at 151, 155), "potential human life., (at 159), "only the potentiality of
life" (at 162), "fetal life" (at 163), and "the potentiality of human life" (at 162, 164)the last referring to the period alter viability. It also states "We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins" (at 159), and " ... a legitimate state interest
need not stand or fall on the acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or
at some other point prior to live birth" (at 150). Putting all this together, one gathers that the Court does not know whether "life" (in the sense of "human" life) exists prior to birth, but its potentiality does in the form of "prenatal'' or "fetaP' life.
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opinions tied unborn life to the order of constittttional values, while
Roe did not. Perhaps the U.S. court could have done otherwise.
While our constitutional doctrine does not acknowledge a full·blown
hierarchy of values apparent or hidden in .o ur Constitution,54 the
Supreme Court has gone beyond literal application of a set of uncon..
nected rules. It has discerned the value of ''privacy", for example,
albeit linking this value to individual rights. Could our Court have
looked at the various direct and indirect references to life in our
fundamental law in order to give at least some attenuated constitutional status to what it calls "potential life"? Or would such a communitarian commitment to values be too alien to our focus on
rights? In any event, in portions of Europe prenatal life has become
something the State must respect, whereas in America it is only
something the State may respect, even in the last moments before
birth.55
Roe, then, treats the unborn as the object of no community commitment at the constitutional level, and as only the optional object
of such a commitment at the legislative level. .And even the latter
option is sharply limite_d. The state interest in potential life without
constitutional status fails entirely prior to viability, when confronted
with a pregnant woman's right to privacy.56 And even in the last period before birth, where the state's interest is_nominally "compelling",57 it cannot compel much. Abortions destructive of the fetus
must be permitted, even just before birth, if they promote what the
Court calls uhealth"58 but which it defines broadly to include virtually every significant reason a woman might have for a third trimester abortion. 59 Donald Kommers, in contrasting the American and
54. But cf. Walter Murphy's attempt to construct such a system around the idea
of "human dignity,. "An Ordering of Constitutional Values:' 53 S. Cal. L_ Rev. 703,
744 ff. (1980). Cf. also the works of Profs. Lawrence Tribe and Frank Michelman.
14
5.5. Even after viability, the· fetus need be .P rotected by the State only [if] the
State is_interested in protecting fetal life" (Roe at 16_3), and Hif it chooses'-' (Roe at
164-65).
56. Prior to viability, abortion can be limited only in the interest of maternal
health, not in the interest of fetal life. Id. at 163-64.
57. ld.
58. Id. at 165. The recent Supreme Court decision of Thornburgh v. A~C.O.G.
106 S. Ct. 2169, 2183, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779, 799 (1986) [interim editions] reemphasizes that
even after viability, there cannot be "any 'trade-off' between the woman's health and
additional percentage points of fetal survival".
59. Roe's companion case, which should be "read together'' with the former (according to Roe at 165), defines "health" to be related to "all factors ... relevant to
the_well-being of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). The Thornburgh Supreme Court opinion; id., does not refer to this definition, but the Court of
Appeals did so in the decision under review. That decision states "It is clear from
the Supreme Court cases that 'health' is to be broadly defined. As the Court stated
in Doe, the factors relating to health include those that are 'physical, emotional, psychological, familial, [as well as] the woman~s age' [quoting from Doe]!' The court of
appeals goes on to say that a law which punished postviability abortions which were·
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German cases, has well described the outcome in our country:
A woman is thus entitled to separate herself from the community while the community is rendered powerless to act
in its common defense for the purpose of safeguarding
shared values.so
The_Roe result mandating elective abortion virtually throughout
pregnancy could hardly be more at odds with the Spanish and German decisions forbidding elective abortion even in early pregnancy.
And that result is likewise far from that reached by other European
nations which, given the very great but nonpersonal public value of
prenatal life, leave the matter of abortion almost entirely up to the
legislature.61
How much likelihood is there that U.S. law on abortion might
someday approach the mainstream of Western jurisprudence? Perhaps quite a bit. Justice O'Connor's dissent in the 1983 Akron case
indicates a desire to find a compelling state interest in protecting the
fetus throughout pregnancy, though there is no evidence she would
recognize constitutional personhood prior to birth.62 If she were to
ground her position not merely on justices; sense of the weight of
potentiality but on the fact and value of actual life or of the constitutional dignity even of potential life, then the two sides of the Atlantic would draw much nearer to each other.
CRITIQUE OF PRENATAL LIFE AS A LEGAL VALUE

Individual rights for fetuses are not the only alternative to individual rights for pregnant women. Community concern for unborn
human life provides another way to look at the abortion problem, a
way which I personally find superior.63 If you and I recognize someone's rights, we are not bound by love to him or her, nor do we feel
between ourselves a bond of fellowship. By contrast, if we jointly
commit ourselves to caring for another, the basis is laid both for affection for the object of our concern and for community among ourdone to avoid the "potential psychological or emotional impact on the mother of the
unborn child's survival" would be clearly unconstitutional; 737 F.2d 283, 299 (1984).
60. Kommers, "Abortion and Constitution,'" supra n. 4 at 282.
61. See supra n. 52.
62. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459466 (1983). She reaffirmed her position, again in dissent, in Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct.
2169 at 2214, 90 L. Ed. 2d 779 _a t 836-37.
63. So I have argued in "A Critique of Abortion Rights,u 3(4) democracy 60 (fall,
1983), and by implication in my broad attack on rights entitled ''A Critique of Fairness,, 16 Valparaiso Univ~ L. Rev~ 459 (1982). See also my "Generosity: A Duty
without a Right," in which I further explore the nature of .r ightless relations among
persons. Paper presented to the Conference on Law and the Ordering of our Life
41
Together (New York, April 1987). But cf. my reservations concerning the value';
approach to human dignity in the article cited supra at the end of my ll. 46.
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selves. The Spanish and German attitudes toward the unborn are
much closer than the official rights-based positions of U.S. pro-lifers
or pro-choicers to the actual feelings of parents for very. young children. Parents feel infants neither to be their private property nor to
be individuals negotiating-their rights at arms' length. Instead and
for many years, a baby is the shared value of a common life.
Yet this new perspective does not answer the question of how
great a weight the child has before and after birth, in ordinary experience or in the law. And here I submit there is an antinomy for
which there may well be no solution.
On the one hand, in early pregnancy, often the fetus is not
sensed to be present as a separate entity, and abortion is not felt to
4
be a kind of homicide.5 On the other hand, a newborn infant is considered a human being, and so is felt to possess what the German
decision calls "inherent" (selbtstiindig} worth. 65 That is, the value of
the newborn is perceived to be inherent in its being, and not in the
eyes of the parental or juridical beholders.
How can these two perceptions be squared with each other?
Obviously, by the assumption that the neonate is a different being
from the preborn fetus. The change in being could be thought to
come -e ither from a qualitative biological leap or from the infusion of
a spiritual soul, or from both.
Our modern quandary arises because we can no longer publicly
affirm either basis for this assumption of discontinuity in being.66
Human life, according to modern science, is a continuum and, as the
German court notes, those traits (e.g., self-consciousness) for which
many especially value our species do not arise until quite some time
after birth. Neither can religion be the ground of a presumed
change of being, in a pluralistic or secular society.
Thus the belief in and commitment to the inherent value of life
after birth requires in our day (but did not require in that of our
great-grandparents) significant protection for the child before
birth67 because our law can no longer cogently proclaim that there
is a difference in kind between the born and the unborn. To put the
matter another way, if we as a legislating community permit rela64. Quintana Ripolles, supra n. 2 at 503, asserts that this is generally the case, at
least as of 1962 (the year -o f that edition of his treatise).
65. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 67; Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 662.
66. Justice Stevens' recent "pro-choice" concurrence in the Tho·rnburgh case, 106
S. Ct. 2169 at 2188, demonstrates both the importance and the futility of such a claim
of discontinuity. He there asserts that the permissibility of abortion hinges upon
there being "a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a
human being" but fails even to hint at any grounds for such a distinction.
67. And indeed throughout pregnancy, according to the argument of the German
court, supra n. 43.
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tively casual abortion we have rendered noncredible our commitment to the inherent value of every human being even after birth.
Yet at the same time, as private individuals involved with early
pregnancies, we may continue not to feel the presence of' another
human life. Consequently, abortion may seem morally permissible,
and our main concern with the law may be not getting caught.
There is one obvious way to cope with such dissonance: strong
nominal legal protection for prenatal life coupled with large numbers of unlawful abortions. 68 Other solutions, which grant the fetus
some kind of intennediate or compromise status, are trying to mix
oil and water. They are. in harmony neither with the intuition that
the newborn's value is great and inherent nor with the intuition that
early abortion concerns the pregnant woman alone.
69
A brilliant and influential article by Arroyo Zapatero, which
appeared in Spain in 1980, attempts to cut this Gordian Knot. There
he proposes that concern for unborn life, wherever and to the extent
it exists, be treated as a kind of cultural value of the community.70
Such life would receive protection not for its own sake, but for the
sake of the community which cares about it in a manner reminiscent of Lord Devlin's prohibition of homosexual activity in order to
promote community moral solidarity,71 and of the common suggestion that we prevent cruelty to animals not to protect them but to
protect human society's sensibilities. In very early pregnancy,
where such felt concern is minimal at best and important maternal
rights are at stake, few if any prohibitions on abortion would be approp:riate.72 Under Arroyo's appro.a ch, we need not seek to harmonize pre- and post-natal intuitions about life, because only those
intuitions (and not life itself) are being valued.
Arroyo's solution fails because we as legislators, as scholars, and
.a s judges are not ourselves outside the community. We are not simply concerned with promoting some ethnic solidarity or sensibility
which we do not share. We are members of the community which
.

.

68. The model of nominal illegality can be seen as a version of "excuse, reasoning on abortion, which is discussed at greater length infra under the heading "The
Doctrine of 'Too Much to Demand.~,, Guido Calabresi's works emphasize the fre·
quent usefulness of a difference between the law as ideal and the law in practice,
e.g., Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 88 (1985) where he contrasts the official
prohibition of euthanasia with actual jury practice.
69. Arroyo Zapatero, supra n. 34. The abortion decision of the Audencia de Bilbao of 24 March 1982 treats fetal life as a cultural value of the community. According to Santiago Mir Puig (''Aborto, estado de necesidad y Constitucion,'' 1982 Rev.
Jur. Cataluna 1043, 1048, n. 1), this foundation for fetal protection entered Spain
with Arroyo Zapatero's article and ~as then picked up by the Bilbao court. See further supra n. 35.
70. Supra n. 34 at 209 ff.
71. See generally Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965).
72. Supra n. 34 at 217 ff.
.

.
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values human life, and as such are concerned with truly protecting
that which we value ,.,not with affirming the value of our irrational
valuing. Someone from Mars might like us enough to want to preserve us in all our contradictory splendor, but we ourselves feel
compelled by honesty to-find ways to resolve rather than to uphold
our contradictions._
Our belief in inherent postnatal human worth cannot logically
coexist with lawful elective or nearly elective abortion, but neither
can logic alone induce women in distress to avoid abortion. Perhaps
that belief will disappear someday, or be pusl1ed back to some point
where a qualitative change (rather than only a change in location, as
at birth) takes place in young human beings- say at self-consciousness, ·o r at puberty. In that case, we could hold to the inherent value
of the latter new kind of being but refuse to p·ush that value forward
to infantile or prenatal stages of life. Or technical developments
such as ultrasound may in effect create windows in the womb, so
that the intuition of inherent value can occur and have a moral effect on pregnant women even in the early months of pregnancy.
But unless we evolve in one of these two ways, I cannot foresee a
wholly satisfactory solution to the law's abortion dilemma.
.

.

THE COURT AND THE SOCIAL STATE

This commentary is presently concerned 'to understand the contrasting degrees of public value recognized in prenatal life in Spain,
Germany, and the United States. We have analyzed and critiqued
the various attempts to conceptualize the fetus as something other
than a constitutional person or private property. We now turn to another important way in which Spain and Germany are more commu""
nitarian than the U.S. in their treatment of fetal life as a
constitutional value.
The classical conception of fundamental constitutional rights is
that of rights against the State. A right to free speech would mean,
for example, that the State cannot punish an individual for the content of what he or she has said. But that right alone would not, say,
give an employee a right not to be punished for speaking by an employer. A constitutional right which were construed to protect an
employee in this circumstance, possibly via a civil damage action,
would have Drittwirkung, efficacy against third parties.
The right to free speech might, however, be construed still more
broadly. It, and other related constitutional provisions, could be
found to be simply specifications of a deeper affirmative vision of
the good society. In this hypothetical case, that value could be taken
to be free and open discussion~ From that value, new specific rights
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could be derived, e.g., the right to read as well as to speak whatever
one wished,-with or without Drittwirkung~
Even more, a court could hold that neither the old nor the new
rights qua rules are what is essential. What really matters is that
there be in the end an effective promotion of free and open discussion, that the whole community in all its legislation and activity
work together for the sake of that shared ultimate value. So, for-example,-a state might be given the duty to subsidize small presses, or
criminally to penalize private censorship, or to teach openmindedness, or otherwise to act affirmatively in ways which a constitutional
court thought would be effective in promoting free and open
discussion.
This latter communitarian vision is closely related in the Spanish decision to the constitutional demand for a ''Social State''.73
Although the same ideas are clearly at work in the German court's
insistence that the State affirmatively protect prenatal life, the
Spanish opinion is noteworthy for the conciseness of its vision and
the clarity of its "social'' label and linkage. Legal Foundation 4
reads in part:
It is also pertinent to make ... some references to the
scope, meaning and function of fundamental rights in the
constitutionalism of our day inspired by the social State of
Law.... [F]undamental rights do not include only subjective defense rights of individuals against the State . . . but
also positive duties on the part of the latter (see in this respect arts. 9.2, 17.4, 18.1 and 4, 20.3 and 27 of the Constitution). But, in addition, fundamental rights ... are the legal
expression of a system of values that, by decision of the
framers, 'h as to inform the whole legal and political organization. . . . Consequently, from the obligation of all powers
to submit to the Constitution, one deduces not only the negative obligation of the .State not to injure the individual or
institutional sphere protected by these fundamental rights,
but also the positive obligation to contribute to the effectiveness of such rights, and of the values that they represent, even when a subjective claim does not exist....74
Such a conception is socialist rather than individualist because
in it the State must take responsibility for the societal results of its
laws, rather than simply setting down minimum rules of conduct
73. Art. 1.1 reads in part "Spain is constituted as a social and democratic State of
Law...."(''Espana se constituye en un Estado social y democratico de Derecho...,)
Other articles further this demand. Art. 9.2 emphasizes effectiveness as a constitutional requirement.
74. BJC, supra n. 5 at 532.
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and letting the strong work within those rules to exploit the weak
for the sake of private interests.
It should not be forgotten that the issue in Spain was whether
or not abortion must be penalized. Affirming the high constitutional
value of unborn life, indeed even affirming fetal personhood, might
not be in itself sufficient to do more than forbid State-sponsore_d
abortions and, of course, allow (rather than require) anti-abortion
legislation. The effective protection of this constitutional value had
to become an affirmative duty of the State, ar1d criminal sanctions
had to be seen as an empirical fact to be relatively effective, in order
for the constitutional challenge to the Spanish government's partial
depenalization of abortion to succeed.
The anti-abortion briefs in this case did not neglect to promote
the Social State doctrine almost as prominently as the value of unborn life.75 Somewhat amusingly, the briefs of the Socialist government argued instead for the classical individualist idea of
constitutional rights, in which such rights are only limits to state action and do not require coercive ·p enal acts of the State.76
Despite the latter "socialist" arguments, the Court affirmed a
strong Social State doctrine in the abortion case and applied it to the
fundamental constitutional value "embodied" in unborn life (L.F. 5),
concluding:
On the basis of the considerations brought forward in
Legal Foundation 4, [the] protection which the Constitution
confers on the one to be born implies for the State two obligations of general character: that of abstaining from interrupting or obstructing the natural process of gestation and
that of establishing a legal system for the defense· of life
which involves an effective protection of the same and that,
given the fundamental character of life, includes also, as an
ultimate guarantee, penal norms. (L.F. 7).
Notice the finesse required by the constitutional value of life.
While abortions. for certain reasons may be permitted, under the cu~
riously individualist rationale discussed below, other abortions must
be criminally punished. But ex post facto punishment is not enough,
as discussed above in the "Chronology and Summary of the Decision.'' In order to give adequate protection to unborn life, the penal
75. Brief of 2 December 1983, at 9, 16-18. Violation of art. 1.1, the Social State
provision, is the second ground of unconstitutionality brought forward by petitioners, just after their discussion of _a rt. 15, the_right to life provision. At page 17 they
wisely appeal to the authority of the works of Garcia Pelayo (now president of the
Court) on the nature of the Social State. Cf., e.g., his Las transformaciones del Estado contemporaneo (1977).
76. BJC, supra n. 5 at 526. The German decision is strongly criticized.
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laws must also require ex ante that a specialist physician certify that
a particular reason exists before the abortion may take place.
The dissents in Spain, as one would expect, object to the Court
acting as a legislature. But none argues clearly that it is the Court's
expansive concept of the Social State which is at fault. Most object
to the Court announcing in advance the kind of statutory protections it wants, rather than waiting to strike or uphold whatever may
be the legislative response to a finding of unconstitutionality. They
also reject the alleged constitutional requirement to use penal sane·
tions here and to perfect the protection given the fetus. The Court's
attempt to discover and apply binding principles or abstract values
latent in constitutional rules comes in for some criticism, but not the
use of values to spell out affirmative duties of the State rather than
only defense rights against the State.
The opinions of the German majority and dissent yield a fuller
understanding of the interaction of the value of prenatal life and the
ideas underlying the Social State. The Court there not only orders
the government to punish elective abortion, in order to fulfill its affirmative duty effectively to protect the one to be born, but also requires that the State teach life's value in legislation and in individual
counseling. 77 This pervasive emphasis on the pedagogical function
of law is the most strikingly communitarian aspect of the German
decision, while it is strangely absent from the Spanish. Surely public education is the ultimate difference between a communitarian
law based on values and an individualist law based on rules. No
matter how many constitutional or legislative rules are derived from
public values, a community of shared values does not arise except to
the extent that individuals come to aim at those values themselves
rather than only at rule compliance. Otherwise even the most elaborate labyrinth of rules is only a complicated game played for the
sake of the furtherance of private interests.
The German dissent well recognizes the difficulties inherent in
court enforcement of constitutional values:
As defense rights the fundamental rights have a comparatively clear recognizable content; in their interpretation
and application, the judicial opinions have developed practicable, generally recognized criteria for the control of state
encroachments for example, the principle of proportionality. On the other hand, it is regularly a most complex question, how a value decision is to be realized through
affirmative measures of the legislature. The necessarily
generally held value decisions can be perhaps characterized
77. See citations supra n. 47. Contrast Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. 2169 at 2178·81,
where counseling discouraging abortion is forbidden to the State.
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as constitutional mandates which, to be sure, are assigned to
point the direction for all state dealings but are directed
necessarily toward a transposition of binding regulations.
Based upon the determination of the actual circumstances,
of the concrete setting of goals and their priority and of the
suitability of conceivable means and ways, very different solutions are possible. The decision, which frequently presupposes compromises and takes place in the course of trial and
error, belongs, according to the principle of division of powers and to the democratic principle, to the responsibility of
the legislature directly legitimatized by the people.78
The dissent's solution seems, however, largely to restate rather than
to solve the problems it has raised. It urges the Court to "confront
the legislature only when the latter has completely disregarded a
value decision or when the nature and manner of its realization is
obviously faulty.'' 7 9
This last language reminds one a bit of the U.S. Supreme
Court's "rational basis" and "state interest'' tests. But note this important difference: Except for a very limited number of impermissible goals (such as the promotion of racism), U.S. legislation may aim
at any state interest. Or, where equal protection or fundamental
rights are involved, it may aim at any "compelling" state interest.
There is not, except very broadly and by negative implication, an order of constitutional values which government must affirmatively
promote. Indeed, our states may sometimes aim at values opposite
to those underlying the Constitution as interpreted by the Court.
A glance at the U.S. abortion decisions of the last ten years will
make clear the contrast between American and European doctrine
here. The original Roe decision proclaimed the value of private
choice with regard to abortion, and saw in that value a prohibition
on state action interfering with abortion. Yet the government is
under no obligation to use its funds80 or its hospitals81 neutrally to
promote choice. Instead, it may favor childbirth over abortion, even
where its motives are the very value philosophies condemned by Roe
as a basis for penalizing abortion.82 In later extrapolation upon this
conclusion, the U.S. Court specifically appealed to the classic constitutionalism of defense rights only rather than the new communitarian emphasis on rights to affirmative state support. 83 In that later
case, the Court ruled that even health abortions need not be funded
78.
79.
80.
81.

[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 71-72; Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 665-66.
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 73; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 666.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977).

82. Id.
83. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).

1987]

STITH: SPANISH ABORTION LAW

539

by the State, despite the fact that in Roe maternal health broadly
construed had been held to be constitutionally more important than
fetal life even after viability.84 The value decisions of our Constitution do not in themselves bind legislatures, and a fortiori need not
be taught to· citizens.
All this is not to say that there would be no possible way for an
anti-abortion U.S. Supreme Court to require criminal laws against
abortion. The Court could try to find some state action (e.g., financial) involved in depenalized private abortions, in order to forbid
them. Or it could find state action in the enforcement of contracts
related to abortion or of laws preventing sit-ins at abortion clinics,
which would de facto make abortion unavailable. Or it could argue
that equal protection, even if it were attenuated prior to birth, mandates some measure of protection for the unborn as long as the killing of neonates remains illegal. (Or it could go the other way and
insist that equal protection for those who take human life requires
that infanticide be unpunished as long as abortion is unpunished.)
But it could nat, without a deep ideological shift, appeal to the social
duty of the government to promote the constitutional value of respect for life.
CRITIQUE OF THE COURT AND THE SOCIAL STATE

Though I am sympathetic both to socialism and to the protection of unborn life, I cannot agree with the approach taken by the
Spanish and German high courts.
My problem is not with the idea of an order of principles implicit in legal rules and usable in deriving new rules. Such analogical reasoning, however indeterminate it may be, seems to me a
necessary part of the honest and thoughtful evolution of public order. It accounts for the greatest achievements both of Anglo-American common law and of European legal science. Nor do I object to
the affirmative quality of these values. I think life together is much
more meaningful if we hold some, though not all, aims in common.
I would like to think that there are common goods, such as life,
which many of our laws pursue and which are and ought to be
taught to us all.
My problem is with the institution of judicial review. Even here
I am less concerned where only defense rights are involved. As long
as a high court can play only a negative role, it must at least work
very hard to achieve institutional dominance. But when judicial review is combined with the vague values and affirmative duties of the
Social State, then the power of judges may be overextended.
84. Id. at 316, 325-26.
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The rule of law (Estado de Derecho) itself may not survive, as
the Spanish government argued in its brie£.85 The whole problem,
in my view, lies in the word "effective" invoked both in Spain and in
Germany. In order for values to be "effectively'' promoted, empirical results rather than only rules must be scrutinized. Rules at the
constitutional and at the legislative levels have to be changed whenever necessary in order to achieve results, even ex post/acto in particular cases. That is how common barn builders would handle the
rules for hammer use. It may even be unconstitutional not to
change the rules whenever they produce results contrary to basic
values. 86
While I wish, with some trepidation, to affirm such rule-less
community (or, better, communities) as an ideal to be pursued, I am
deeply concerned about placing virtually unlitnited power over the
development and content of such community in the potentially arbitrary discretion of any very small number of persons.
Judicial review and the Social State should not be combined.
Perhaps judicial review should not ·e xist even for defense rights.
Such review implies a hostility. between the legislating community
and the individual which ideally should be overcome by education
and by more participatory forms of democracy, rather than accommodated. But in any event judicial review should not extend to the
positive and programmatic social duties stated or implied in a constitution. Those principles should be the starting points for public reasoning by all citizens, not the privileged prerogative of a tiny group
of jurists.87
85. BJC, supra n. 5 at 527..28.
86. Rule utilitarianism has no adequate response here, for it contains an antin..
omy. Even if we need rigid rules in order to preserve our values, why should those
rules be followed when they seem certain to produce disvalue? A legal system
wholly concerned about consequences could not avoid constantly rethinking its
rules. It might avoid anarchy by disabling individual citizens or judges from ignoring
rules, but it would have to make centralized review available in every ease where
one could plausibly argue that a revised rule-would more efficiently promote the values at stake. For an excellent review of the proposed solutions to this general moral
and legal quandary, see Alexander, "Pursuing the Good--Indirectly," 95 Ethics 315
(January 1985).
87. I do not think one should belittle a judicially unenforced constitutional social
duty or right as "merely a platform plank elevated to constitutional status." Cf. the
discussion of "programmatic•·' rather than uenforceable, constitutional provisions in
Italy in Cappelletti,. Merryman, & Perillo, The Italian Legal System 58 (1967). From
the deliberations of juries to those of supreme_courts we often rely upon non-enforceable good faith implementation of legally binding principles. I do not see why
elected representatives should enjoy less confidence.
The Spanish constitution itself distinguishes between "rightsu and "duties'; (arts.
14-38) and "guiding principles of social and economic politics, (arts~ 39-52), making
the former "binding'' (arts~ 53.1 and 53.2) and the latter o:nly "informing" (art. 53~3)~
Perhaps values (such as .;life") latent in these rights and duties should be considered
mere "guiding principles,, though my own view is more that they should be consid•
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THE DOCTRINE OF "TOO MUCH TO DEMAND"

Life is a "superior," "fundamental," and "central" constitutional
value in Spain, and the fetus "embodies'' this value. The government has an affirmative duty to protect unborn life by means of
criminal penalties for its destruction. Yet the high court there goes
on to permit abortion in all the circumstances listed in the bill under
review: grave danger to maternal life or health, rape, and likelihood
of severe disability in the child. How does the Court make such a
turnaround?
One might have expected the Court, in line with its communitarian perspective elsewhere, to look to the common good and to argue that the protection of unborn life is not, or does not always
result in, the highest constitutional value. But it nowhere asserts
that other values are more important than fetal life. It mentions
two theories by which the bill in question may be justified: legislative choice between conflicting values and the doctrine of non-demandability (L.F. 10). The latter, however, is the only clear referent
in most of the situations considered. The Court appeals primarily to
the idea that a continuation of pregnancy in such circumstances is
just too much for the criminal law to demand of an individual. Even
if such abortions do more harm than good to the values of the community, the State need not punish them because there is a limit to
what individuals must sacrifice for constitutional values.
The doctrine of non-demandability in Spain has its origin in
German legal thought, where it was originally conceived as an extra88
statutory defense to crime from an individualist perspective.
It is
felt in the Spanish Penal Code in various ways, particularly in Article 8, to which the Court specifically refers in its opinion.89 That article permits the defense of necessity when an otherwise illegal act
ered binding in conscience upon the legislature but not enforceable by courts (at
least not against statutes).
88. One of the earliest uses of this concept in criminal law occurred in the famous 1897 Leinenfanger decision of the Reichsgericht. There the Court went beyond
the penal code to reason that although the omission in question "considering the
common good ... could be demanded of the actor", one must also ask whether it
could be demanded of the accused under the circumstances. 30 RGST 25-28, as
quoted in Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 935.
89. Art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code exempts various persons from criminal responsibility, including the insane and infants. Sec. 4 adds an exemption for "one
who acts in defense of a person or rights, his own or alien (propios 0 ajenosr' as long
as there has been illegitimate aggression, rational choice of means, and lack of provocation. The key sec. 7 exempts "one who, impelled by a state of necessity, in order to
avoid an evil of his own or one alien to him (mal propio o ajeno), injures a legal good
(bien juridico) of another person . . . ," provided that the evil caused is not greater
than that which he seeks to avoid, that he has not intentionally provoked the situation of necessity, and that he does not have a special obligation to sacrifice himself.
Sec. 9 covers those who act under uirresistible force,. and sec. 10 those who act out of
insuperable fear "of an equal or greater evil." Art. 8 thus incorporates ideas both of
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is done in order to avoid a greater or an equal :harm. The doctrine
of non-demandability is thought by the dominant opinion in Spain to
account for the latter situation:9 0 It is just too much to demand of a
person that he or she sacrifice a personal interest simply for the
sake of someone else's merely equ.a l interest. A concrete example of
the influence of this doctrine is found in Article 18 of the Penal
Code, which exempts close family members from punishment for
harboring a fugitive. Again, one might say that the penal law just
cannot demand that a fugitive's spouse or parent refuse to take him
or her in, despite the general prohibition of such an act. 91
As will become evident later, it is very important to understand
whether this doctrine is one of justification or of excuse. That is~
does the personal burden under which the defendant labors serve to
make an otherwise wrong act right, or does it only mean that the
defendant is not to be blamed (or even simply not to be punished)
for the still wrongful act?
The dominant theory92 in Spain appears to treat the nondemandability doctrine as one of excuse~ Under such an approach, no
one is justified in preferring his or her own values, or own spouse, to
the values established by the community, but nevertheless such antisocial acts are not punished where the subject in some sense could
not act otherwise" An act which is wrongful but nonpreventable, or
at least not preventable by means of the criminal law, is not. to be
punished. Note that if a mere excuse for an act is involved, legitimate defense against the act remains possible, and there are a
number of other significant legal consequences to be explored later.
On the othe-r hand, there are s.o me Spanish doctrinal considerations which point to calling the non-demandability idea a justification.93 And it can be argued that where no one, or no one except a
~'excuse,,

(what might be called "necessity in the order of events"') and of "justification'' (what might be called "necessity in the order of ideas.,).
Luis Jimenez de Asua, 7 Tratado de Derecho Penal196 (2nd ed., 1962, 1977) con·s iders fear and necessity under confict of equal goods to be excuses originating in the
non-demandability idea. He adds other examples from the Spanish Penal Code, including the harboring of a fugitive by near relations (art. 18) and the omission of
non-demandable aid (art. 489).
Some Spanish opinion also supports non-demandability as a legal excuse existing outside the Penal Code, e.g. Ricardo de Angel Yaguez et aL; Ley del aborto
100-01 (1985).
90. Rodriguez Devesa, Derecho penal espanol, parte general at 556, 609. .19 (1979).
91. The rationale for this defense is disputed, but the dominant opinion today ap..
pears to be that non-demandability is its basis. See Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at
1014, and Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 90 at 618-19.
92. Both Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 932 ff. and Rodriguez Devesa, supra n.
90 at 609 ff. treat non•demandability under the more general category of exculpation
or non-blameworthiness, i.e., as a kind of excuse rather than of justification, and assert this to be the dominant view.
93. Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 967-69, discusses sorne penalists who consider
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hero, is in some sense able to comply with a certain legal command,
then acts or, omissions in violation of that norm lose their wrongful
character even though they do not avoid more harm than they
cause. Furthermore, there are places in Spanish law where a theory
of non-demandability seems to have resulted in a full statutory justification, in the sense of a legal certification of the non-wrongfulness
of the conduct in question. The penal law requirements to stop
crime (Art. 338 bis), to rescue (Art. 489 bis), and to give assistance
(Art. -586(2)) apply only where they can be observed without .r isk to
the actor or to a third party,. Note that the omission of risky acts is
here justified, at least in the special sense that it is e-x cluded from
the definition (tipo) of these crimes, although Article 8 would not
even excuse it for the actor is refusing to risk a slight personal interest at the cost of greater harm to others. This contradiction can
perhaps be overcome if we cannot demand and expect public spirited
actions to the degree to which we exact public spirited omissions.
Legislators supporting the enactment of the new abortion statute appealed frequently to the non-demandability notion often as
an excuse.94 Likewise the government brief in the constitutional
case is written as though the issue of nondemandability is one of
whether or not a woman having an abortion should be simply exculpated (i.e., excused) in the specified situations.95 The only dissents
which mention the matter in some detail link the idea of non-demandability to that of legal excuse.96
non-demandability to be a justification. Rodriguez Devesa seems to use the non-demandability notion as a general concept containing all justifications and exculpa.
tions, as ·well as using it as a specific concept involving non-blameworthiness, supra
n. 90 at 609-11.
Note that the mere fact that an obje,c tive balancing of values may be involved is
not necessarily a consideration leading us to classify non-demandability as justification. As George Fletcher has pointed out, Rethinking Criminal Law 804 (1978), we
,e xpect people to be: able to make greater sacrifices when more is at stake. We may
excuse someone who breaks another's leg under the threat of losing his own, but not
someone who blows up a city under the same threat.
94. The socialist Minister of Justice, Ledesma Bartret, argued on 25 February
1983 that the nondemandability of continued pregnancy in certain circumstances is a
cause of excuse, ("inculpabilidad") for abortion. Supra n. 6 at 17. On 25 May that
year, Saenz Coscullela, speaking "in the name of the Socialist Group'', argued that
the abortion bill does not '" legalize". Indeed, it expresses a "generic disapprobation,
of abortion, while establishing an "excuse" ("excusa") for therapeutic abortion, and
refuses to blame ("inculpar'') abortions occurring where further pregnancy is not
demandable. .Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, II Legislatura, No.
40, at 1850. Again on 4 October 1983, the PSOE member Sotillo Marti argued, in
favor of nonpunishment of some abortions; that where other conduct .i s not demand..
able, an act lacks blameworthiness, i.e,, is excused. Id., No~ 61 at 2888.
95. BJC~ supra n. 5 at 529-30.
96. Francisco ·T omas y Valiente insists that the abortion bill contains neither a
legalization nor a depenalization of abortion, but simply a declaration of non-punishment in certain situations, while maintaining intact the definition of the crime
('•manteniendo intacto el tipo delictivo"}. A judge, not a physician, thus should de.
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In some of the above arguments, however, there is an undercurrent of justificatory reasoning. 97 And on at least one occasion,
spokespersons for the proposed legislation clearly insisted that the
abortions at issue were to be treated as lawful, not simply
unblameworthy. 98
The Constitutional Court's own opinion, unfortunately, is far
from clear. Neither in its general discussion of nondemandability
(L.F. 9) nor in its specific applications of that idea (L.F. 11) does the
Court label the notion "excuse" or "justification". The opinion does
not, however, explicitly treat any abortion as justified in the sense
that it is the best solution, the one which maximizes net resultant
value. Except in the Court's treatment of abortion to save the
mother's life and perhaps to avoid grave danger to her health
(where it may possibly be treating the child as an aggressor against
whom the mother has a right of self-defense (I.,.F. ll(a) ), the Court
looks overtly to the idea (and only to the idea) that some pregnancy
continuations are too much to demand of a woman. In considering
rape pregnancies, the Court lists the constitutionally recognized values of the woman which have 'b een harmed by that act of violence.
But it does not suggest that denying her an abortion would have a
further overall negative effect on the values at stake. Instead, it rea- ·
sons that obligating her to put up with the consequences of rape is
not demandable (L.F. ll(b))" In the case of abortion for probable
grave disabilities in the child, the Court is even more straightforward. The basis for non-punishment of such abortions, according to
the Court, is that to require continuation of pregnancy would be an
imposition on the mother beyond that which is normally demandable. That parents put up with the inevitable insecurity attending
such a pregnancy is too much to demand. It is hard even to imagine
that avoiding such parental anxiety is constitutionally a fundamental value equal to life in Spanish law, so that the Court could in any
event appeal only to nondemandability· in order to uphold this portion of the law in question (L.F. ll(c)).99
cide when those situational requirements have been met, since the acts regulated by
art. 417 continue being criminal ("continuan siendo delictivas"). He adds, however,
that the basic rule prohibiting abortion appears to him of doubtful constitutionality.
Id. at 539. See also the less clear linkage of nonculpability and excuse in the opinion
of Jeronimo Arozamena Sierra. I d. ·a t 537.
97. Arozamena Sierra, id. Also Sotillo Marti, supra n. 94, and the government
brief, supra n. 95.
·98. So argued bill supporters Lopez Riaiio and .Sotillo Marti on 7 September·
1983, supra n. 33 at 2121 and 2140-41.
99. Despite the Constitution's explicit directive, found in art. 49, that the State
protect the disabled, the Court does not discuss the possible repercussions which the
legalization of such abortions may have on future public and parental attitudes and
actions with regard to those born with severe handicaps but then this point is likewise ignored in the briefs. For research indicating a negative impact, see Fletcher;
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Once again, the often unspoken background for all these Spanish arguments is German legal theory. It was in Germany that the
idea of non-demandability first arose doctrinally.100 It is there used
to explain code-based "excusing necessity", which is structured dif..
ferently from the necessity defense in Spain. 101 The German abortion depenalization statute itself permitted post-twelve-weekgestation abortion where there was a danger to maternal life or
health or of serious fetal defect such that no alternative to abortion
could be demanded (zumutbar and verlangt respectively).102
Not surprisingly, the West German Constitutional Court likewise uses the non-demandability doctrine to deal with abortion. The
Court indeed appears to base its approval of hardship-case abortions
exclusively upon this idea even where continued pregnancy would
threaten a woman's own life or health.103 It applies the doctrine
without further argument to the case of potentially grave disability
abortions (which the Court calls "eugenic" abortions) 104 and to "social" abortions involving equivalent hardship because of the woman's life context. Unfortunately, the Court sends mixed signals on
the issue of whether nondemandability makes all these abortions
justified or merely excused. 105
Spanish commentary upon the German constitutional settle"Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns," 2(1) Hastings Center Studies 21 (January
1974).
Nor does the Court anywhere suggest the now commonplace notion that life
with severe disabilities may have relatively little value or even be a clisvalue. Such a
suggestion would obviously go a long way toward tipping the scales in favor of parental interests.
·
100. For a discussion of the nature and context of the German (and, indirectly,
the Spanish) concept of uunzumutbarkeit", see Fletcher, supra n. 93 at 833 ff. and
Albin Eser, "Justification and Excuse," 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 624 (1976). See also
Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 at 930 ff.
101. The German Penal Code separates necessity (Notstand) into two articles, 34
and 35, and titles the first "Justifying Necessity" and the second "Excusing Necessity." According to the latter, certain persons are excused when they must act ille·
gaily to avoid a danger to life, limb, or liberty, unless they could have been expected
{demanded, ''zugemutet,) to accept the risk involved. See e.g., Dreher & Trondle,
Strafgesetzbuch 188, 196 (42nd ed. 1985).
102. The actual statute was somewhat more complex than this summary. See
[1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 4-6, and Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3 at 611-12.
103. (1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, 48-50; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 647 . .48. See also supra n. 49.
104. Id., indicating approval of earlier governmental arguments in favor of nonpunishment of disability- and rape-based abortions.
105. For example, the Court indicates that even where abortion is not punished,
the State is expected to remind a woman of her "fundamental duty (Pflicht) to respect the right to life of the unborn, to encourage her to continue the pregnancy."
Id. Yet the Court late.r insists that the law distinguish the justified (gerechtfertigt)
cases of abortion from the reprehensible (verwerflich) ones. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1,
58; Jonas & Gorby, id. at 654-55. Sorting out these remarks in light of the basic principles governing the decision, the Dreher & Trondle commentary concludes that the
Constitutional Court's decision points in the direction of an excuse understanding:
supra n. 101, prenote 9 to§ 218, at 999-1000.
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ment, prior to Spain's own proposed law reform, was generally critical. Commentators both opposing106 and favoring107 extensive
abortion rights had difficulty understanding how non-demandability
could permit abortion in the face of the German high court's strong
affirmation of the duty of the State to protect unborn life. At most,
it was argued, the Court's reasoning would lead to excusing such
abortions, not to justifying them.
.
United States criminal law does not contain an explicit defense
of non-demandability. Our "duress" or "coercion" defense, which is
generally considered an excuse, is perhaps its closest analogue, but
that defense is more limited than the Spanish Article 8 or German
"excusing necessity".108 It could not apply to abortion because no
one is threatening harm to the mother unless she ends her pregnancy. There exists for us no comprehensive penal or constitutional
principle which ensures that no one is punished for doing an act
whenever not doing the act is ''too much to demand""
Despite our restricted theory of excuses, however, it could be
argued that something like non-demandability pervades 011r law, and
does so often in the form of justification. After all, except in Vermont, we do not require rescues of strangers in the first place, not
even where they involve_no risk whatsoever. It has been suggested
that it is too restrictive to impose on everyone that they be good samaritans.109 Again, we sometimes permit a violent response to -aggression, even where retreat is possible, and especially where retreat
would involve some risk . 11° Are we perhaps saying that it is too
much to ask of victims that they act against their own interests in
order to protect the interests of aggressorst even when the net harm
caused by resistance is much greater than that caused by retreat?
Roe v. Wade obviously did not need to draw upon anything like
the above lines of reasoning; its denial of constitutional value in the
unborn child meant that it did not have to search for a justification
or excuse for abortion beyond. the right of privacy. But there have
been a number of scholars who have sought to justify the result in
Roe, elective abortion, by appealing to our alleged tradition of "bad
samaritanism".111 The explicit thrust of these arguments is that
even if the fetus were recognized to be a living human being, _a nd
106. Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 25, at 99. Rodriguez Devesa latter joined in the
book En Defensa de la Vida, supra n. 35. opposing the abortion depenalization bill.
107. Arroyo Zapatero, supra n. 34 at 205.
108. Supra n. 101. The German penal art. 35 is limited to excusing those who protect themselves or those near to them. But there remains some support for nondemandability as an extrastatutory defense.
·
109. Calabresi, supra n. 68 at 102-03, reports and disagrees with this sentiment.
110. See e.g., the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code§ 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
111. See- e.g., Regan, "Rewriting Roe v. Wade., 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979) and
Thompson, "A Defense of Abortion," 1 Philos. & Pub. A.ffidrs 47 (1971).
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even if it were seen to be a person possessing a constitutional right
to life, elective abortion would be permissible because our law does
not generally require individuals to aid others at substantial cost to
themselves. Though I have not found these thoughts to coalesce
around precisely the non-demandability doctrine of Europe, surely
something similar is at work here. If elsewhere we are individualists believing in laissez faire and laissez mourir, it must seem to
many of us "too much to demand, of a pregnant woman that she
alone make great sacrifices ,a point to which I return at the end of
this commentary.
CRITIQUE OF THE

"Too MUCH TO

DEMAND" DOCTRINE

There are three final points I would like to make at some,
length. The first is that the concept· of non-demandability, even if
accepted as a starting point for legal reasoning, is incapable of doing
what its adherents want it to do; namely of giving at least some
abortions the full support of the law. The second is that non-demandability is in fact unacceptable as a first principle of reason, for
it obscures as much as it reveals. The third is that, despite its deficiencies, the doctrine remains extremely useful to show that the
abortion dilemma .is merely one manifestation of the tension between community and individual and that a solution to the dilemma
depends, therefore, on a, reluation of the tension..
As we have seen, there are two ways to understand Spanish
(and German) constitutional law on abortion that the legislature
may treat some abortions as excused or that it may treat them as
justified. My argument is that under both hypotheses a tension results, in the law,- but only in the latter case does it approach a
contradiction.
The first hypothesis excuse seems to me the most plausible
interpretation of the Spanish court's opinion. The doctrine of nondemandability is ordinarily treated in Spain112 and in Germany113 as
one involving excuse. Given both courts' refusal to affirm that the
unborn child has substantially less legal value than the mother, it is
hard to see how any abortion (except, perhaps; for the mother's life)
could be justified without at least a great deal of argumentation,
which is left unsupplied. 114 Moreover, the Spanish law in question
bears a stronger resemblance to Penal Code Article 18 (excusing
family members who harbor a fugitive} than it does to Article 489
bis (declaring a duty to rescue only where there is no risk to one112. Supra n. 92.
113. Albin Eser, supra n. 100 at 627, 637. This essay is also a useful introduction
to the basic structure of German (and of much of Spanish) penal theory.
114. See generally the Dreher & Trondle discussion cited, supra n. 105.
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self). Like the former and unlike the latter, the abortion depenalization law does not expressly alter the definition {type) of the
crime but only precludes the imposition of punishment in certain
cases. This difference, I think, should be understood to be one of
excuse vs. justification_, as has been argued.
As excuse, non-demandability can be given a fairly precise
meaning. Penalties are set according to what is ordinarily necessary
for deterrence and must not be excessive in proportion to ultimate
culpability. But then persons having to make unusually 'h igh sacrifices in order to comply with the law cannot be compelled to do so.
Such persons are arguably both less culpable (because the net harm
caused by the excused offense is less than that caused by an ordinary offense where no harm is at the same time avoide.d ) .a nd less
deterrable (because again of the unusual personal harm resulting
from failure to commit the offense). Thus, within the limits set by
proportionality [See L.F. 10]; there may be no penalty adequate to
deter individuals from acts necessary to avoid great personal hardship. Without an adequate deterrent motive, the ''ideal type" rational self-interested individual may be literally unable to comply
with the law. And where the threat of punishment can serve no
purpose, it should not even be made. Acts involving great and unusual hardship cannot be exacted11!> by ex post facto penalties and
should, therefore, be excused by law even if those acts have a net
negative effect on public values.
Excuse fits better than justification into the communitarian
ethos of the Spanish decision. It is perhaps n~t logically inconsistent, but it certainly would be a shift in ideology for a court one moment to emphasize duties to pursue common values and the next
moment to declare. individuals to be legally justified in destroying
those values. By contrast, there would be nothing strange about a
fully developed socialist jurisprudence recognizing that human beings are not (or at least not yet) so constitutecl as to be able in all
circumstances to give the same weight to others' interests as. they do
to their own. Where this is the case, proportionate punishment may
serve little purpose. The penal law, at least, should excuse such unjustified self-preference~
But, for a number-of reasons excuse thinking alone cannot fully
legalize abortion. Excuse is considered to apply only to the person
so burdened that he or she is unable to act rightly toward the fetus.
It is not thought to apply to third parties. Specifically, it would
115. "Exactability, is the word used by Jonas & Gorby, supra n. 3, to translate
Zumutbarkeit. I have ordinarily preferred "demandability, because of its greater
normative resonance in English, but here the more physically coercive feeling of the
word "exacted" c~ptures the point better.
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seem not to apply to the doctor performing the abortion any more
than the excuse of duress applies to bystanders who help a
threatened person carry out some difficult crime. The government's
strongest argument, non-demandability as excuse, in favor of its
statute makes little sense, for that statute clearly exempts from punishment all parties to certain abortions, not just the mother. The
difficulty of excusing the aborting physician had been noticed already in 1982, in a quite cogent Spanish law journal article. 116 If the
anti-abortion brief had contained more than its one exceedingly
short reference to this point,117 perhaps the Court would not entirely have overlooked this stumbling block in its lengthy summary
of the arguments.
At this time, of course, the non-punishment of the doctor has
been approved. That is the Court's holding, regardless of whether or
how that conclusion is supported by its reasoning (at least until
fuller argument leads it to a different conclusion). The principle of
legality, the principle of non-punishment without a prior statutory
violation, would seem to preclude any penalty for a physician doing
an abortion in one of the specified circumstances. But this does not
entirely dispose of our problem. If abortion is only excused rather
than justified under penal law, what is its status in civillaw?118 For
example, could a father sue for damages because his unborn child
has been aborted? (Or could he sue a physician for negligently fail·
ing to abort his handicapped infant?) Must, or even may, State social insurance programs pay for the commission of acts still
considered unlawful? And what is the legal status of a contract to
deliver abortifacients if abortion remains legally unjustified? 119
Even more significantly, if abortion remains always wrongful albeit excused, could not third parties intervene to stop abortion of developmentally disabled fetuses, especially if they did so in some
minimally intrusive non-violent way? The necessity defense in the
United States has not been very successful in preventing the convic•

116. Cerezo Mir, supra n. 31.

117. Petitioners' supplementary brief of 3 January 1983 [sic] at 16.
118. The Spanish court opinion, in L.F. 14, explicitly avoids resolving the civil law
issues raised by the non-punishment of abortion. BJC, supra n. 5 at 536. (Not all the
issues I here raise were, however, brought forward in petitioners' briefs.) Rodriguez
Devesa, supra n. 90 at 557, 616 points out that civil responsibility remains for excused
criminal acts. See also Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 89 at 201. .02. Jonas & Gorby, in
their commentary supra n. 3 at 591-92, raise the possibility of civil suits in Germany,
and the Dreher & Tronclle discussion cited supra n. 105, makes clear that the legitimacy of social insurance payments for unpunished but possibly still unlawful abortions is a live issue in Germany. See also the excellent survey and argument by
Kluth, who concludes that abortion remains illicit and therefore cannot be a duty in
civil law, "Zur Rechtsnatur der indizierten Abtreibung," 5 ZJ.ges.FamR 440 (1985).
119. See the Spanish Civil Code art. 1275, which deprives contracts for an illicit
cause of any effect. An illicit cause is defined to be one opposed to laws or morals.
Cf. the German Civil Code, art. 134.
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tion of those who sit in at abortion clinics,120 but Spanish law looks
very different. Article 8's idea of necessity (preservation of the
greater legal value) could be appealed to. Non-violent intervenors
could argue "legitimate defense" just as a bank teller can defend
himself or an associate against a robber acting non~culpably under
121
duress.
Most precisely on point may be that in Spain a person is
justified in preventing another from destroying something of his or
her own which has social utility.122
120. See, e.g., Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d
483 (1983); City of St. Louis v. Klocker 637 S.W. 2d 174 (Mo. App. 1982); Cleveland v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill.
App. 3d 288, 48 Ill. Dec. 141, 416 N .E.2d 36 (1980); Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d
1291 (D.C. App. 1979). These post-Roe lower courts have generally refused even to
listen to necessity arguments concerning the fact and value of prenatal life. Their
opinions are fascinating in the light of the constitutional models developed earlier in
this article. One might have thought that American courts would construe Roe's
constitutional right to abortion to be solely a rule against state intervention, particularly after the Maher and Harris cases (see supra n. 80 and 83 and accompanying
text}. Private intervention in abortion clinics (to protect what proffered evidence
supposedly would show to be human life with significant ethical, statutory, or common law value) would remain unaffected by Roe and so possibly justified. But in
fact virtually all lower court opinions treat Roe as imposing a negative value judgment, in regard to the fetus, on the whole legal order, quite analogous to the positive
value imposed in Spain and Germany. The analogy is close: In those European nations the mandated high value of fetal life requires the State to punish conduct
which destroys the fetus. In the U.S. the mandated low value of fetal life requires
the State not to refrain from punishing conduct which prevents fetal destruction.
It could be argued that some of these lower courts have disallowed the necessity
defense simply to prevent disorder at abortion clinics, without any sense of constitutional mandate. But the bare possibility of acquittal under necessity might not significantly increase the number of sitters willing to be arrested at abortion clinics.
And even if clinic chaos were to result, a quick fix might be had in the form of a
legislatively imposed abortion exception to the necessity defense. Judicial imposition
of such an exception would not be required.
121. Both Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 90 at 557, 616 and Jimenez de Asua, supra
n. 89 at 201-02 make clear that forcible defense is legitimate against acts which are
merely excused. The former specifically applies this principle to the law excusing a
parent who harbors a fugitive, at 619. The explicit wording of art. 8( 4), referring to
the defense "of the person or (of] rights" might not apply to the defense of the "legal
good" of unborn life, but art. 8(7) would seem to offer obvious support for abortion
clinic interventions. The latter permits actions against personal goods in order to
avoid any "alien" evil. See the precise wording, supra n. 89. Of course, there would
also have to be a weighing of the harm caused by the intervention against the value
of any fetal life saved. In Spain this calculus is ordinarily based upon a comparison
of the usual criminal penalties for, say, trespass and abortion. Rodriguez Devesa,
supra n. 90 at 546. The result of the balancing might well vary depending upon the
means and consequences of the sit-in.
The wording of the German Penal Code is even more favorable to such defenses.
In addition to the necessity arguments of arts. 34 and 35 of the Penal Code, supra n.
101 arts. 32 and 33 would seem to provide another justification and excuse argument
for nonviolent clinic interventions. These Notwehr defenses are available to those
who act to protect "another" against an unlawful attack, and the German court decision seems potentially open to an interpretation of the unborn child as Hanother".
See supra n. 38-46 and accompanying text.
122. Rodriguez Devesa, id. at 554.
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Nor are these arguments merely technical or sophistic. It is
clearly one thing to say that someone does not deserve punishment
for an act because she could not be expected to behave otherwise,
and quite another for the State to support or even not to prevent
that act. Remember that non-demandability is a penal law doctrine;
there are some things which are supposedly too much to demand by
means of ex post facto penalties. The Spanish court's own discussion
of non-demandability theory (L.F. 10) emphasizes that penal punishment for failure to comply with a legal norm is sometimes "totally
unsuitable", which does not entail that the norm itself is to be called
into question. The Court also points out that the State's duty to protect the legal good of life continues to subsist in other areas. If the
State allows civil suits against abortionists, denies insurance coverage, does not recognize contracts, and does not punish sit-ins in abortion clinics or the equivalent, it is not imposing punishment on
women who have had abortions. There is nothing incoherent in a
legal system which makes all abortions illegal, but excuses some women who have them with the thought that compliance with the law
is too much to demand of persons in great distress. To the contrary,
a system would be incoherent which punished justified acts (e.g., sitins)123 in order to further excused ones (i.e., abortions).
That this is the present state of Spanish law is implied by a
number of sources. Proponents of abortion depenalization, and at
least one of the high court dissenters, argued that abortions were
not being "legalized", as has been pointed out above. 124 Opponents
of abortion now read the Court decision to say that abortion has not
become "licit".125 If such statements mean anything, they indicate a
legal situation very close to that which has been described and very
far from a legal right to abortion.
Can a case be made for a contrary interpretation of the Spanish
decision, that it declares non-demandable abortions to be not excusable but justifiable and that the statute upheld is in fact one of justifi123. If non-violent clinic intervention were futile (in the sense that women wishing abortions will invariably simply postpone them if a particular clinic becomes unavailable for a time), the necessity justification for sit~ins would lose much of its
force. But the mere fact that pregnancy continuation is too much to demand by
means of a posteriori punishment does not, without more, prove that prior interven•
tion to close clinics or to dissuade women might not be effective and normatively
called for. Surely a legal system could appropriately abolish penalties for some or all
(attempted) suicides, under nondemandability excuse thinking, without entailing the
abolition of defenses to battery for those who intervene to prevent suicides.
124. Supra n. 94 and 96. But cf. supra n. 98.
125. So argues Federico Trillo-Figueroa in his early unpublished response to the
Court entitled "En defensa de la vida, (the same title as that of the pre-decision
book referred to supra n. 35 and to which he contributed). The anti-abortion commentary Ley del aborto, supra n. 89 at 91 ff., 327, also asserts and implies the continuing illicitude of almost all abortions.
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cation? The most obvious argument in favor of this interpretation is
not a legal but a political one. There might be little point in bringing about a legal situation which keeps women out of jail but which
may well have very little effect on the actual availability of abortion~
If abortion ,remains wholly illicit, clinics will be under burdens so
great that they may find it unprofitable to operate. But an attempt
at legal argumentation can also be made: Excuse reasoning is hard
put to explain the Court's approval of the non-punishment of the
aborting physician~ 126 And the analogy of abortion law to fugitive
law is not perfect. In the latter case, only certain actors (i.e., family
members) are declared exempt from punishment. In the former,
the act itself of abortion is declared non-punishable!~ From the point
of view of penal law, what can be made of a norm without a penalty? Perh~ps the definition {type) of the crime of abortion has in
effect been cut back after all, though not by the direct wording used
in the Penal Code's article 489 bis- requiring rescue.1 27
There is an undeniable appeal in the justification interpretation
of non-demandability. Always to value the interests of others
equally with one's own is a heroic or saintly ideal. To demand compliance with this ideal would clearly often be too much·---whence the
argument for excuse. But even to ask for heroic behavior may seem
uncalled for. Don't we have a right not to be heroes, without incurring legal disapprobation? Quite a few spokespersons for abortion
reform made just such an appeal, saying that to bear a child after
rape or one likely to be gravely disabled is to be heroic, not just lawabiding. Analogies were made to self-defense law, which gives the
victim's interest priority over that of the aggressor, and to the legal
permission not to rescue others where any personal risk is involved.128 In those situations, too, the law recognizes an apparent
126. The Dreher & Trondle commentary, however, has little problem treating the
physician's exemption as based upon separable public health grounds. That is, in or. .

der for excused abortions to be performed in safety, physicians are permitted to perform. them, without implying that the law favors or is even neutral on the question
of whether abortions should occur. Supra n. 101, prenote 9e to art. 218; at 1001-02.
Spanish law has a similar catch-all category of excuse, called the excusa absolutoria,
which the law could use to understand the status of the aborting physician. See
Jimenez de Asua, supra n. 23 and 89. But cf. Nathanson, Aborting America 193-94
(1979), who argues that the advent of modem antibiotics, of the plastic suction curette, and of self-abortive drugs makes illegal abortion no longer a major public
health problem even if the medical :a bortionist is held penally accountable.
127. Despite its own conclusion that abortion is only excused, the
Dreher=Trondle commentary, id., makes clear that the dominant legal opinion in
Germany is that non-punished abortions are to be considered justified. See generally
Eser, ''Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences," 34 Am. J. Comp. L.
369, 375 n. 40 and accompanying text (1986) and Gropp, Der stra/lose Schwangerschaj'tsabbruch (1981). The latter's arguments virtually ignore the need to integrate
penal and constitutional theory, however, while the Dreher & -T rondle_argument is
built upon an attempt at such integration.
128. On 25 May 1983, in the Congress of Deputies, the PSOE spokesperson Saenz
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right not to sacrifice one's own lesser interests for the sake of
others' greater interests. The communitarian principles of the necessity defense here give way to a deep individualism.
Such a politico-legal theory is quite evidently not in harmony
with a spirit of dedication to common goals. Instead, it would seem
to be founded on something like social contract reasoning. People
with essentially private interests come together out of a limited need
for mutual defense and cooperation. They agree to accept a certain
burden, but no more, for the sake of their joint enterprise. Once
they have made the maximum expected contribution, they have a
right to refuse further payments. Where an act or omission is necessary in order to avoid an excess contribution to public values, that
act or omission is legally justified.
It is a strange beast, this hybrid of Social State and social contract. From the point of view of community values, the act or omission is wrong. It results in a net value loss. Yet from the point of
view of the individual, the act is right. The non-hero reasons that
one should not have to give to the community anything more than
one thinks one is likely to need from the community. Since he or
she is certainly never going to be a fetus in need of maternal support, why should he or she feel obligated to give such support?129
The idea of non-demandability can in this way be thought to
justify abortion (particularly in circumstances of unusual hardship)
despite the fact that the values of the community, the values for the
sake of which we have come together, thereby suffer. Abortion is
somehow justified and not justified at the same time. The community permits abortions without saying that abortions ought to occur.
What legal concepts can express the permission to be nonheroic in regard to abortion or to non-rescue or to other analogous situations? Surely not "claim" and "duty". The fact that someone
violates no legal duty in refusing to maximize the common good of
Cosculluela argued that the law values one's own life more than that of another, and
that the law cannot demand heroism of a pregnant woman, supra n. 94 at 1853, 1854.
On 7 September 1983, Sotillo ;M:arti argued for the abortion depenalization bill by appealing to the fact that the law does not always demand that we rescue others, even
though it may be our moral duty to do so. Again on 5 October 1983, he argued that
to require the continuation of pregnancy in the hardship conditions covered by the
proposed law would be to demand heroism, which the Penal Code does not do when
it comes to rescue. Supra n. 33 and 31 at 2138, 2946.
Cf. Sanford Kadish's important attempt to understand the interaction of the
values of proportionality and autonomy: 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in
the Criminal Law," 64 Cal. L. Rev. 871 (1976).
129. Someone who thinks in this way puzzlingly overlooks the fact that he or she
has already needed and received aid as a fetus. Yet such an analysis appears domi·
nant in the decisions in question. Nowhere is the duty to support new life treated in
these cases as a matter of simple reciprocity for benefits everyone has earlier
received.
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life does not mean that others violate a legal duty in striving by
means other than penal law to further that good. In other words,
any Spanish (or German) permission to abort should be labeled a
130
"liberty"
rather than a "right". The State does not insist sub
poena that a pregnancy continue, but neither may a pregnant woman insist upon support or protection for abortion. In this view,
abortion would be objectively legal, not only excused, but it would
be legalized only as a liberty and not as a claim upon the community. Such an understanding is similar to an old way of looking at
the legal situation called "necessity" that it returns all parties involved to a "state of nature", where legal duties and claims in the
full sense do not yet exist. 1 3 1
But if abortion is only a liberty, involves only the absence of penal prohibition, necessity doctrine might still justify intervention to
prevent abortions.132 Necessity always involves individual interference with what are otherwise legal rights of others. Even where one
is not legally required to furnish his coat to a freezing child, the
child may be excused and even justified in taking it. Or, better, suppose a nonswimmer bystander to be watching helplessly as an unknown child lies drowning at the bottom of a pool. A good s ·
er
walks by but refuses to help because he already has a cold and does
not wish to risk making it worse. The bystander blocks the swimmer and grabs his hat, telling him he will not get it back unless he
rescues the child. Would a court convict the nonswimmer of battery
or of theft? I suspect not. Thus even assuming arguendo that we
think the swimmer legally justified in refusing to help, we may also
think the nonswimmer justified in forcing him to help. That we do
not use the criminal law to coerce people into making sacrifices does
not mean that we do not wish such sacrifices to be made, nor that
we are willing to use criminal penalties to ensure that no sacrifices
are made. If pregnancy is only like rescuing, and both are just sometimes too much to demand by means of criminal penalties, then
abortion has not yet won the full support of the law. Particularly
under a jurisprudence of "effective'' community values, it would
seem that courts ought to ignore rules wherever acts further the
greater constitutional value. And, at least in the case of abortion to
avoid bearing a disabled child, it would be very hard for a Spanish
tribunal to find that prevention of such an abortion, by means of
130. The reference here is to the concept which Hohfeld calls "privilege". See
generally, Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919).
131. See discussion in Rodriguez Devesa, supra n. 90 at 555.
132. And civil damages for abortion might still be recoverable by a father. Even
an act that is justified under penal law may incur liability for civil damages. See Penal Code art. 20, ~nd the commentaries thereon by Jimenez de Asua, e.g., supra n. 89
at 198-99.
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non-delivery of abortifacients or of a non-violent sit-in, is not in accord with the constitutional order of values. On the side of the fetus
are the values of life and of protection for the handicapped, while
the Court mentions no constitutional value at all on the side of
abortion.
The theoretical and practical disadvantages of the conclusion
reached here are obvious. Abortion, even if fully legal in the sense
that non-rescue in the face of risks is fully legal, may still not become easily available ~because non-cooperation with, and even intervention against, the performance of abortion may be justified by
the thinking at the base of the necessity defense. Conceptual and
public order may thereby be threatened. These disadvantages do not
often arise in the parallel case of non-rescue, because not rescuing
another does not ordinarily require the participation of third parties,
nor does the intervention of third parties ordinarily preclude not
rescuing. By contrast, abortion necessarily implicates third parties
and the judicial system which judges those parties.
If the idea of non-demandability were limited to excusing women who undergo abortions, it would lead to no such anomalous results and would probably find near universal support. Most states in
the U.S., for example, de facto and even de jure, 133 did not punish
women for abortion prior to Roe v. Wade. But they did prosecute
abortionists. The values of life and order are compatible with excuses which are truly and merely excuses, with the desire not to use
penal law against women, but not with more.
Alternatively, we can hold to a justificatory sense of the non-demandability of bearing a child, letting it mean community support
for a right not to make undue sacrifices. But we can do so in an orderly fashion only at the cost of devaluing human life (or of somehow honestly separating fetal life from postnatal life). If unborn life
has little value, abortion does little if any damage, and so contracts
for it should be enforced and no one is justified in preventing it.
In other words, either abortion must remain a crime (though
one for which many or even all women need not be punished), or it
must be seen to promote the common good (because unborn human
life hardly counts as part of that good). Only these two solutions are
internally coherent in theory and practice.
Is the doctrine of non-demandability the best place to begin to
think about which solution to seek? A good argument can be made
that this doctrine is not a very helpful starting point (anywhere in
133. See Wohlers. "Women and Abortion," published undated by the American
Center for Bioethics. The author surveys pre·Roe statutory and case law and con...
eludes that women were almost always exempted from punishment by one or the
other.
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the world) because it is likely one-sidedly to obscure as much as it
reveals of the legally significant dimensions of pregnancy and of
abortion.
To ask whether a continuation of pregnancy in certain circumstances is demandable of a woman is to emphasize exclusively the
affirmative and sacrifical character of pregnancy. In other words, it
makes us think of pregnancy as an act of giving and of abortion as
an omission or a ceasing so to give. But surely in many ways abortion is an act by the mother or by her agent, and continued pregnancy is an omission. Somehow this makes a difference. It is often
worse legally, if not morally, to throw someone who has slipped into
one's home out into the freezing cold than not to let her in to begin
with. Abortion, at the least, is like that act of expulsion. And pregnancy, after conception, in an important sense requires no further
acts. Gestation is automatic, one might say, as long as one omits to
terminate it. This fact makes a difference at least psychologically.
It is harder to pay taxes than to endure government withholding of
them. To donate blood to a relative every day for nine months could
easily feel like a much greater sacrifice than to have something similar occur by itself in the womb. The power of the non-demandability
doctrine is precisely that, in all contexts (not just abortion), it makes
us treat what could be seen as acts instead as omissions. We ask not
"Should he have robbed the bank?" but "Can we demand that he
have his legs be broken by those trying to force him to rob the
bank?" I am not suggesting that pregnancy is wholly an omission
and abortion is wholly an act, only that there are important considerations on both sides and the question of non-demandability tends
to make us overlook one side.
This focus on omission to sacrifice also takes our eyes off immediate intentions and leads us loosely to speculate about ultimate motives something we would be much less likely to do with regard to
an act. In the abortion context, for example, many write as though
avoiding the burdens of pregnancy were the main purpose of abortions,134 though Roe itself emphasized post-natal burdens.135 But the
desire to separate oneself from the fetus, before or after birth, is not
the sole aim of abortions, otherwise adoption would have been mentioned by Roe as an alternative way to avoid the burdens to which it
points. Clearly, many people who have abortions aim not just at
avoiding the burdens of pregnancy or of childcare, but at not being
mothers at all. A decisive motive may be to avoid the burdensome
adoption choice. The intent then comes to be to kill the fetus. A le134. See, e.g, Regan & Thompson, supra n. 111 and Calabresi, supra n. 68-though
the latter at 114 notes that the purpose may also be to kill the fetus.
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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thai act with a lethal intent is much harder to justify or excuse than
a failure to be a hero. Non-demandability makes us forget the first
way of looking at abortion and think only about the second.
Furthermore, just as non-demandability makes us turn away
from the intent of an otherwise illegal act, it tends to make us forget
the policy promoted by the particular law at issue. If we ask only
"Can we force people to kill and risk being killed?,, we may say
"no,. But if we ask whether -n ational survival justifies the military
draft, we may say "yes"'. If new life is to be treated as a fundamental public value, as the Spanish court asserts, it cannot be omitted
from the question of how much can be demanded. 136 Yet this value
is wholly left out of that court's demandability discussions.
Non~demandability also, it seems to me, tends to make us think
in very general terms. Should one have to sacrifice one;s legs?
Should one be expected, under penalty, to put up with a handicapped child? The generic answer to these questions may be "no".
But we should also refer to the various sources of a special duty to
make sacrifices. Non-demandability does not in itself137 allude to
those sources.
Thus, U.S. commentators have sought to show that, even if the
fetus were a person, the law should not impose the burden of supporting him or her on the mother, any more than one should have to
support a famous violinist who needs transfusions fo-r nine
months. 138 But if the fetus is a person, it is not only a person. It is
also one's own child, and that fact may make all the difference.
It is true that the Spanish high court uses the normal burdens
of parents as a standard of what can be demanded, 139 which is no
doubt higher than the standard for citizens in general. But are parents committed to putting up only with "normal" burdens? This
question is never clearly addressed. Though the Spanish court uses
article 8 necessity as a prop for its decision,. it never discusses that
portion of article 8 which denies the necessity defense to one who
has a special obligation to sacrifice herself.
Nor ,a re the many possible sources of the duties of parents explored. Is there a natural duty resulting from a biological relationship? Is there a duty resulting from causation, from the sexual
creation of a situation in v1hich the fetus is in peril? Or does the act
of intercourse involve a tacit consent to care for life resulting from
'

136. See George Fletcher's argument that even excuse reasoning must involve
value-balancing. Supra n. 93.
137. But demandability as found in the German Penal Code art. 35 does require
an inquiry into special legal relationships.
138. Supra n. 111. The violinist is Thompson's creation.
139. See L.F. 11, BJC, supra n. 5 at 535.
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that act? 140 Does it matter that, if one were still a fetus, one would
e~ter into a social contract to give birth, even under hardship, to
other fetuses in order to be born oneself in like circumstances?
Rather than careful analysis of the strengths of each such factor,
non-demandability (at least as expounded by the Spanish and German Constitutional Courts) encourages a superficial global
assessment.
Yet in the final analysis, despite all its flaws, the question of demandability should not be overlooked. Most of the myriad sources
of obligation listed above end up with women carrying greater burdens than men. That is, the burde·n s even of ordinary pregnancy,
not to speak of hardship pregnancy, are greater than our law places
on non-pregnant people during most of their lives and those burdens
141
fall unequally onto one sex. Whether or not we consciously have
recourse to a doctrine of non-demandability, we are bound to feel
uneasy about demanding that women alone bear such burdens.
There are two ways, in my opinion, that this uneasiness can be
overcome and both bring us back to the Social State. As the Spanish court pointed out (L.F. 11) with regard to the burden of handicapped children, community aid can make the sacrifices entailed by
pregnancy and parenthood much less to the point where they may
be demandable. If the legal community highly values unborn life, it
ought to share the burden of bearing that life by means not only of
social support services before and after birth, but even of special
benefits and privileges for mothers142 including mothers who give
up their children for adoption. That is what is often done in gratitude to young people who have been soldiers.
Secondly, the community must not refrain from asking for significant sacrifices from others besides women who have special abilities to contribute to what we value in common. From taxation and
business regulation to zoning and blood donation, .a high standard of
expectation must be set and backed up by some sort of penalty for
unexcused failure to comply with that standard. Only then will the
sacrifices of pregnancy seem obviously demandable. It is on some
level bizarre, even if logically consistent, to take a stand both against
abortion and for a laissez-faire economy and society.

140. Spanish law also creates another exception to art. S's: necessity defense for
those who intentionally bring about the siate of necessity.
141. See generally Calabresi, supra n. 68 especially at 101 f£.
142. Glendon, supra n. 52, indicates that almost all Western nations provide- ma·
ternity benefits, child care, paid leaves, paternity support, family benefits and the
like to a far greater degree than is done in the U.S. Perhaps it is partially for this
reason that the burdens at least of normal pregnancy and parenthood seem not too
much to demand in Germany .a nd Spain.
•

